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Couture: Optimal Issuer Disclosure of Opinions

OPTIMAL ISSUER DISCLOSURE OF OPINIONS
Wendy Gerwick Couture*

Abstract
This Article adds to the scholarly literature about
the optimal level of disclosure by issuers of
securities by proposing a new theoretical
framework that encompasses not only the choice
between silence and disclosure, which has been
widely discussed, but also the subsidiary decision
between disclosure as an opinion and as a
statement of fact, which has been ignored. This
framework informs the Securities and Exchange
Commission’s ongoing review of mandatory
disclosure rules and contextualizes the potential
impacts of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in
Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers District Council
Construction Industry Pension Fund,1 which
clarified that differential liability standards apply
depending on whether a disclosure is expressed as
an opinion or as a statement of fact. In addition,
this Article, drawing from a collection of 1,264
post-Omnicare opinion disclosures, provides an indepth qualitative review of the types of disclosures
that issuers are choosing to express as opinions
rather than as statements of fact. Finally, this
Article analyzes these post-Omnicare opinion
disclosures under the proposed theoretical
framework and concludes that several discrete
adjustments are required to incentivize optimal
issuer disclosure decisions.
INTRODUCTION

The regulation of public companies’ securities disclosures is in a
dynamic state. The Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) is
* Wendy Gerwick Couture is a Professor of Law at the University of Idaho, where she teaches securities
regulation, business associations, and white collar crime.
1. Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Constr. Indus. Pension Fund, 135 S. Ct. 1318,
1327, 1332 (2015).
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in the midst of a Congressionally-mandated comprehensive review of
mandatory disclosure rules,2 which invokes the deep body of legal
scholarship about the optimal level of disclosure by issuers of
securities. Under the classic articulation, the optimal level of issuer
disclosure is achieved when the marginal social benefits of disclosure
equal the marginal social costs.3
This articulation, however, is incomplete. By assuming that
disclosure is a binary decision between remaining silent and
disclosing, the articulation fails to recognize that there is a subsidiary
decision that issuers must make when choosing to speak: whether to
express the disclosure as an opinion or as a statement of fact. For
example, if an issuer elects to make a disclosure about the relative
resolution of the TVs that it manufactures, the issuer must choose
whether to express the disclosure as an opinion—“we believe the
TVs we manufacture have the highest resolution available on the
market”—or as a statement of fact—“the TVs we manufacture have
the highest resolution available on the market.”4 These two
statements, which convey information about the TVs’ relative
resolution with differing levels of certainty, also differ with respect to
their marginal social benefits (e.g., the usefulness of the disclosure to
investors) and their marginal social costs (e.g., the investigation costs
of the company). The importance of this distinction was highlighted
by the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Omnicare, Inc. v.
Laborers District Council Construction Industry Pension Fund,5
which clarified that differential liability standards apply depending
on whether a disclosure is expressed as an opinion or as a statement
of fact.
In this Article, I propose an analytical framework that
encompasses not only an issuer’s choice between silence and
disclosure, but also the issuer’s choice between disclosure as an
opinion and as a statement of fact: the Issuers’ Disclosure
2. Business and Financial Disclosure Required by Regulation S-K, SEC Release No. 34-77599
(April 13, 2016) (seeking comment on business and financial disclosure requirements in Regulation SK); Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act (“FAST Act”), Pub. L. No. 114-94, 129 Stat. 1785, §
72003 (2015) (mandating that the SEC study the modernization and simplification of Regulation S-K);
SEC Report on Review of Disclosure Requirements in Regulation S-K (Dec. 2013),
https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2013/reg-sk-disclosure-requirements-review.pdf
(evaluating
the
requirements of Regulation S-K for public companies for public companies generally, as a first step
towards addressing their impact on Emerging Growth Companies); Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act
(“JOBS Act”), Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 313, § 108 (2012) (directing the SEC to study the
modernization and simplification of registration requirements for Emerging Growth Companies).
3. E.g., Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice is Not Investor
Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1339 (1999).
4. Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. at 1318 (2015) (providing these examples).
5. Id.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol86/iss2/4

2

Couture: Optimal Issuer Disclosure of Opinions

2018]

OPTIMAL ISSUER DISCLOSURE OF OPINIONS

589

Framework. This framework draws on the implications of
Omnicare’s holdings and should inform the SEC’s ongoing review of
mandatory disclosure rules.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Drawing on the existing
scholarship about the optimal level of securities disclosure, Part I
proposes the Issuers’ Disclosure Framework. This framework
theorizes the optimal choices for both issuer disclosure decisions: (1)
the decision whether to remain silent or disclose (“Decision A”); and
(2) the subsidiary decision whether to disclose as an opinion or as a
statement of fact (“Decision B”). Under this framework, it is optimal
for issuers to remain silent about some topics (including immaterial
information), to express some disclosures as opinions (including
disclosures whose informational value derives from the speaker’s
state of mind), and to express some disclosures as statements of fact
(including disclosures where the marginal benefits of certainty
exceed the marginal costs of attaining it).
In Part II, I overlay onto the Issuers’ Disclosure Framework the
competing pressures that affect whether issuers make optimal choices
with respect to Decisions A and B: (1) market forces; (2) direct and
indirect costs of disclosure; (3) risk from inaccuracy or misleading
incompleteness; (4) risk from nondisclosure; and (5) risk from
violating a mandated form of disclosure. To the extent these
pressures are not calibrated to incentivize optimal issuer choices,
potential adjustments are identified that could incentivize issuers to
make optimal decisions: (1) influence Decisions A and B by
adjusting the direct or indirect costs of disclosure; (2) influence
Decisions A and B by adjusting the risk from inaccurate or
misleadingly incomplete disclosure; (3) influence Decision A by
adjusting the risk from nondisclosure; and (4) influence Decision B
by adjusting the risk associated with violating a mandated form of
disclosure.
Part III analyzes the potential impacts of the Supreme Court’s
holdings in Omnicare on the Issuers’ Disclosure Framework. In
Omnicare, the Court clarified the differential liability standards for
issuers’ statements of opinion as opposed to statements of fact: (1) an
opinion is actionable as an untrue statement of material fact only if
the opinion was disbelieved by the speaker; and (2) an opinion gives
rise to omissions liability to the extent the issuer fails to disclose a
fact showing that the company lacked the basis for expressing the
opinion that a reasonable investor would expect.6 In order to assess
the potential impact of these holdings on Decisions A and B, I
6. Id. at 1327, 1332.
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perform a qualitative analysis of 1,967 pre- and post-Omnicare issuer
opinion disclosures. Drawing therefrom, I conclude that Omnicare’s
impact on the pressures affecting issuers’ disclosure decisions was
minimal, which is unsurprising in light of the countervailing nature
of Omnicare’s holdings and the strength of the other pressures
affecting issuer decision-making. With respect to Decision A,
Omnicare may have slightly increased the pressure on issuers to
remain silent rather than disclose opinions. With respect to Decision
B, it may have slightly increased the incentive for issuers to express
disclosures as opinions rather than as statements of fact.
Finally, Part IV applies the Issuers’ Disclosure Framework to
issuers’ post-Omnicare disclosure decisions. Drawing from a
collection of 1,264 post-Omnicare opinion disclosures, I catalogue
the breadth of subjects about which issuers are currently expressing
opinions, demonstrate how the Issuers’ Disclosure Framework
applies to those disclosures, and analyze whether issuers are making
optimal disclosure decisions. I conclude that, while most of these
disclosures are optimally expressed as opinions, several adjustments
to the pressures affecting issuer decision-making are warranted. In
particular, I contend that adjustments are required to incentivize
issuers to make disclosures about the adequacy or suitability of their
physical properties for existing operations (Decision A) and to do so
as statements of fact (Decision B). I also argue that, although issuers
are already making the optimal choice to disclose management
reports on the effectiveness of internal controls over financial
reporting (Decision A), adjustments are warranted to incentivize
issuers to express those reports as statements of fact rather than as
opinions (Decision B).
I. ISSUERS’ DISCLOSURE FRAMEWORK
A. Optimal Level of Issuer Disclosure

Under the classic articulation, the optimal level of issuer
disclosure, both at the time of issuance and on an ongoing basis, is
achieved when the marginal social benefits of disclosure equal the
marginal social costs.7
Issuer disclosure—by ensuring that investors and the market have
accurate and comprehensive information about the company—
benefits society in several interrelated ways.8 First, issuer disclosure
7. E.g., Fox, supra note 3, at 1339.
8. See Business and Financial Disclosure Required By Regulation S-K, SEC Release No. 34-
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promotes price accuracy,9 which furthers the efficient allocation of
capital.10 Second, issuer disclosure protects investors by enabling
them to make informed decisions.11 Third, issuer disclosure reduces
agency costs by providing shareholders with information about the
performance of the board and management,12 which “assist[s] in both
the effective exercise of the shareholder franchise and shareholder
enforcement of the management’s fiduciary duties.”13 These societal
benefits of disclosure are interrelated. For example, even if a
particular investor does not read an issuer’s disclosures, if those
disclosures promote accuracy in securities pricing, the investor is
nonetheless protected by trading at a “fair” price.14
77599, at 13-14 (Apr. 13, 2016) (summarizing the various benefits of corporate disclosure).
9. Accord Alan R. Palmiter, Pricing Disclosure: Crowdfunding’s Curious Conundrum, 7 OHIO
ST. ENTREPREN. BUS. L.J. 373, 427 (2012) (describing “[h]elping investors translate information into
prices” as “the fundamental role of securities law”); Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs
of “Inaccurate” Stock Prices, 41 DUKE L.J. 977, 979 (1992) (characterizing the creation of “stock
markets in which the market price of a stock corresponds to its fundamental value” as the “principal
goal of securities laws”); Donald Langevoort, Information Technology and the Structure of Securities
Regulation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 747, 781 (1985) [(hereinafter Langevoort, Information Technology]) (“By
providing investors with the information necessary to make knowledgeable investment decisions,
mandatory disclosure is designed to ensure that the market price truly reflects the intrinsic value of the
security.”).
10. Merritt B. Fox, Randall Morck, Bernard Yeung, & Artyom Durnev, Law, Share Price
Accuracy, and Economic Performance: The New Evidence, 102 MICH. L. REV. 331, 339 (2003)
(“Greater share price accuracy at a time when an issuer contemplates implementing a new project by
means of a share offering will bring the issuer’s cost of capital more in line with the social cost of
investing society’s scarce savings in the contemplated project. As a result, these savings are allocated
more efficiently, going more to the most promising proposed projects in the economy.”); James Dow &
Gary Gorton, Stock Market Efficiency and Economic Efficiency: Is There a Connection?, LII JOURNAL
OF FIN. 1087, 1105 (1997) (“[T]he prospective role is to provide information to the manager. If there is
relevant information for the investment decision that is not already contained within the firm, then in
equilibrium the manager will use stock prices to help make the investment decision and stock prices will
themselves reflect this.”).
11. Stephen Choi, Regulating Investors Not Issuers: A Market-Based Proposal, 88 CAL. L. REV.
279, 280 (2000) (“Securities regulation in the United States revolves around investor protection.
Unscrupulous promoters, for example, may seek to defraud investors by convincing them to put their
money into worthless investments. Alternatively, promoters may attempt to guide investors into
investments where the risks are both high and difficult to assess.”).
12. Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1047, 1048 (1995); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a
Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 752 (1984) (“[A] mandatory disclosure system
should reduce the average agency costs of corporate governance. To the extent that this reduction
occurs, even fully diversified investors benefit because, in effect, we are reducing an element of
systemic risk that portfolio diversification cannot itself eliminate.”).
13. Fox, Morck, Yeung, & Durnev, supra note 10, at 339-40.
14. George J. Benston, Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 132, 151-52 (1973) (“The concept of fairness is
difficult to define operationally . . . . Nevertheless, the stock market could be considered ‘fair’ if the
prices of securities at any point in time are unbiased estimates of their intrinsic value . . . . Then
whenever an investor decides to buy or sell or hold a security, he can be assured that the market price
has discounted completely the financial information.”); see Fox, supra note 3, at 1338 (“More
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At the same time, however, issuer disclosure imposes societal
costs. The marginal costs of a particular disclosure include both
direct costs, such as the costs of compiling the information and
preparing the disclosure report,15 and indirect costs, such as
competitive costs due to competitors’ ability to benefit from the
disclosure16 and the lost productivity of management due to the
diversion of time.17
This classic articulation of optimal issuer disclosure, while
providing a helpful theoretical framework, erroneously assumes that
the disclosure decision is a binary choice between silence and
disclosure. Rather, an issuer has a subsidiary choice about the form
of disclosure—as an opinion or as a statement of fact—which merits
a more nuanced analysis.
B. Optimal Issuer Disclosure of Opinions

Issuers have three options when considering whether to make a
disclosure: (1) remain silent; (2) express the disclosure as an opinion;
or (3) express the disclosure as a statement of fact.
Silence is self-explanatory. Because there are myriad reasons why
a company might choose to remain silent, silence is a messy signal
that does not necessarily convey that the withheld information is
negative.18
The distinction between a statement of opinion and a statement of
fact depends on the degree of certainty with which the statement is
information about the issuer and the resulting increase in its share price accuracy produces social
benefits in the form of improved selection of new investment projects, improved managerial
performance, and reduced investor risk.”).
15. Alan R. Palmiter, Toward Disclosure Choice in Securities Offerings, 1999 COLUM. BUS. L.
REV. 1, 12 (1999) (“There are direct costs: the issuer pays for assembling mandatory information,
retaining accountants to certify financial information, and hiring inside and outside lawyers to format
and present it.”).
16. Id. (“Regulatory compliance imposes competitive costs: public disclosure, ostensibly meant
for investors, can harm the issuer’s business when used by competitors, particularly privately-held
competitors that do not make reciprocal public disclosures.”).
17. Id. (“There are indirect opportunity costs: compliance with mandatory disclosure diverts
management attention from the issuer’s business . . . .”).
18. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of
Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 687 (1984) (“Because of these ‘good’ reasons for nondisclosure,
investors cannot infer unambiguously that no news is bad news . . .”); Joseph A. Franco, Why Antifraud
Prohibitions Are Not Enough: The Significance of Opportunism, Candor and Signaling in the Economic
Case For Mandatory Securities Disclosure, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 223, 264 (2002) (“When the
total amount of information is undefined and open-ended, the disadvantaged party cannot readily infer
that information is being concealed merely from observing the counterparty’s public disclosure.”); Fox,
supra note 3, at 1361 (“Silence is not a complete substitute for affirmatively disclosing a lack of good
news because the market knows the issuer could choose a low-disclosure regime for reasons other than a
lack of good news.”).
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expressed.
In Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers District Council
Construction Industry Pension Fund,19 the Supreme Court explained
that “[a] fact is ‘a thing done or existing’ or ‘[a]n actual happening,’”
while an opinion is “‘a belief[,] a view,’ or a ‘sentiment which the
mind forms of persons or things.’”20 The Court further clarified:
“Most important, a statement of fact (‘the coffee is hot’) expresses
certainty about a thing, whereas a statement of opinion (‘I think the
coffee is hot’) does not.”21
By including an opinion signal, like “we think” or “we believe,”
which communicates to investors that a statement is uncertain, a
company can effectively transform a statement of fact into a
statement of opinion.22 For example, in Omnicare, the Court
classified a CEO’s statement that “[t]he TVs we manufacture have
the highest resolution available on the market” as a statement of fact,
and a CEO’s statement that “I believe (or I think) the TVs we
manufacture have the highest resolution available on the market” as a
statement of opinion.23
By omitting an opinion signal, a company can transform a
statement of opinion into a statement of fact; however, the absence of
an opinion signal should not always compel the classification of a
disclosure as a statement of fact if the statement nonetheless conveys
the requisite uncertainty.24 On the one hand, if the content of a
disclosure is capable of being ascertained with certainty (such as the
relative resolution of a company’s TVs), the disclosure is a statement
of fact if the company does not include an opinion signal to convey
that the disclosure is expressed without certainty. On the other hand,
if a reasonable investor would understand that the content of a
disclosure is inherently uncertain (such as a prediction about the
future), the disclosure should be classified as an opinion even absent
an opinion signal.
These three options can be expressed pictorially as follows, with
19. Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Constr. Indus. Pension Fund, 135 S. Ct. 1318
(2015).
20. Id. at 1325 (quoting WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 782 (1927)).
21. Id.
22. Wendy Gerwick Couture, False Statements of Belief As Securities Fraud, 43 SEC. REG. L.J.
351, 354 (2015) [(hereinafter, Couture, False Statements]) (“After Omnicare, although one court has
suggested otherwise, it seems clear that a statement of fact can be transformed into a statement of
opinion merely by adding the preface ‘I think’ or ‘I believe.’”).
23. Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. at 1326.
24. Couture, False Statements, supra note 22, at 355 (“The better rule post-Omnicare is to
examine the certainty of the statement from the perspective of a reasonable investor: if a reasonable
investor would interpret the statement as expressing a lack of certainty—either because the statement
includes introductory language like ‘I believe’ or ‘I think’ or because the subject matter is inherently
uncertain—then the statement should be categorized as an opinion.”).
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Decision A as the choice between silence and disclosure and
Decision B as the subsidiary choice between disclosure as an opinion
and as a statement of fact.

Issuers'
Disclosure
Framework

Decision A

Decision B

Remain silent

Disclose
As an
opinion

As a statement
of fact

1. Optimal Decision A

The optimal disclosure decision depends on the marginal costs and
benefits of a disclosure. With respect to Decision A, silence rather
than disclosure is the optimal issuer choice if the marginal costs of
speaking exceed the marginal benefits thereof. This situation arises
in two contexts: (1) the potential disclosure (regardless of its form as
an opinion or as a statement of fact) would have nonexistent or
negligible informational value, such that even moderate marginal
costs inevitably would exceed the marginal benefits of disclosure; or
(2) despite its informational value, the potential disclosure
(regardless of its form as an opinion or as a statement of fact) would
be so costly that its marginal costs would exceed its marginal
benefits.
Most immaterial information—which no reasonable investor
would consider important in making in investment decision and
which does not significantly alter the “‘total mix’ of information
made available”25—falls into the first category. For example, issuers
should remain silent rather than disclosing the individual salaries of
low-level employees or the exact location of the board’s next meeting
because this information has negligible informational value, such that
25. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 232 (1988).
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even moderate marginal disclosure costs would exceed the marginal
benefits. On the other hand, material but unduly costly information
falls into the second category. For example, if issuers disclosed
audited financial statements on a quarterly basis rather than
annually,26 these disclosures would undoubtedly have informational
value, but the marginal costs of quarterly auditing would likely
exceed the marginal benefits thereof.
When the SEC adopts a mandatory disclosure rule, it engages in
this cost-benefit analysis.27 Indeed, the SEC’s recent reconsideration
of the CEO pay ratio disclosure rule exemplifies the Decision A
analysis.28 The rule requires public companies to disclose the ratio of
the median annual total compensation of all employees (other than
the CEO) to the annual total compensation of the CEO.29 Proponents
of the rule argue that the ratio provides material information to
investors30 and that its marginal costs do not exceed its marginal
benefits,31 while detractors contend that the informational value is
negligible32 and exceeded by the costs of calculating the ratio.33
26. SEC Division of Corporate Finance, Financial Reporting Manual, at §§ 1100, 1120, 1320
(updated Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cffinancialreportingmanual.pdf
(explaining that companies must disclose audited annual financial statements and unaudited interim
period financial statements).
27. The SEC and the D.C. Circuit disagree about whether this cost-benefit analysis is mandatory
or voluntary. Compare SEC Division of Risk, Strategy, and Financial Innovation & Office of the
General Counsel, Letter to the Staff of the Rulewriting Divisions and Offices (March 16, 2012),
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/riskfin/rsfi_guidance_econ_analy_secrulemaking.pdf
(“No
statute
expressly requires the Commission to conduct a formal cost-benefit analysis as part of its rulemaking
activities. But as SEC chairmen have informed Congress since at least the early 1980s—and as
rulemaking releases since that time reflect—the Commission considers potential costs and benefits as a
matter of good regulatory practice whenever it adopts rules.”), with Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d
1144, 1148–49 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“We agree with the petitioners and hold the Commission acted
arbitrarily and capriciously for having failed once again . . . adequately to assess the economic effects of
a new rule. Here the Commission inconsistently and opportunistically framed the costs and benefits of
the rule; failed adequately to quantify the certain costs or to explain why those costs could not be
quantified; neglected to support its predictive judgments; contradicted itself; and failed to respond to
substantial problems raised by commenters.”).
28. See SEC, Public Statement, Reconsideration of CEO Pay Ratio Implementation (Feb. 6,
2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/reconsideration-of-pay-ratio-rule-implementation.html.
29. 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(u) (2017); 15 U.S.C. § 78n(i) (2012).
30. E.g., Comment Letter from Lynne L. Dallas, Professor of Law, University of San Diego
School
of
Law
(March
21,
2017),
https://www.sec.gov/comments/pay-ratiostatement/payratiostatement.htm (identifying and explaining that “there are many reasons why the CEOemployee pay ratio is material to investors”).
31. Id. (explaining that “the SEC has given companies considerable flexibility in computing their
ratio”).
32. E.g., Comment Letter from Thomas W. Farley, President, New York Stock Exchange (May
10, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/comments/pay-ratio-statement/payratiostatement.htm (contending that
“many of our listed companies question that value of this information and are concerned that the
disclosure will not be meaningful to stakeholders”).
33. Id. (explaining that the “general consensus of views of our listed companies is that . . .
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2. Optimal Decision B

If the marginal costs of a potential disclosure do not exceed its
marginal benefits, the issuer must proceed to the subsidiary Decision
B. Disclosure as an opinion rather than a statement of fact is the
optimal choice in two contexts: (1) the informational value of the
disclosure would actually be enhanced by its expression as an
opinion rather than as a statement of fact; or (2) the costs of attaining
the level of certainty required to express the disclosure as statement a
fact rather than as an opinion would be so great that the marginal
costs of the disclosure would exceed its marginal benefits if so
expressed. Conversely, disclosure as a statement of fact rather than
as an opinion is optimal if two elements are present: (1) the
informational value of the disclosure would be enhanced by its
expression as a statement of fact rather than as a statement of
opinion; and (2) the costs of attaining the level of certainty required
to express the disclosure as a statement of fact would not be so great
that the marginal costs of the disclosure would exceed its marginal
benefits if so expressed.
The informational value of a disclosure is enhanced by its
expression as an opinion in two contexts. First, if the disclosure
relates to something inherently uncertain or subjective, a disclosure
as a statement of opinion would have more informational value than
a disclosure as a statement of fact because an opinion would more
clearly convey the presence of uncertainty or subjectivity.34 As an
example, a disclosure about the uncertain impact of new regulation
would be better expressed as an opinion rather than as a statement of
fact because an opinion would convey the uncertainty of the impact.
Second, if the informational value of the disclosure emanates from
the speaker’s state of mind itself, such as the speaker’s philosophy
with respect to a topic, a disclosure as a statement of opinion would
be more valuable than a disclosure as a statement of fact because it
would more precisely convey that information.35

certain requirements of the final rule are overly complex and unduly costly in many respects”).
34. See Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. at 1328 (“A reasonable person understands, and takes into account,
the difference we have discussed above between a statement of fact and one of opinion. She recognizes
the import of words like ‘I think” or “I believe,’ and grasps that they convey some lack of certainty as to
the statement’s content.”).
35. See Wendy Gerwick Couture, Opinions Actionable As Securities Fraud, 73 LA. L. REV. 381,
407 (2013) [hereinafter Couture, Opinions] (arguing “that opinions have ‘something special’ about
them—the mental processes of the speaker”).
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3. Example of Issuers’ Disclosure Framework

Consider the hypothetical example in Omnicare of a CEO’s
statement, on behalf of the issuer, about the relative resolution of the
TVs that it manufactures.36 At the outset, under Decision A, the
issuer faces the decision about whether to remain silent or speak. As
discussed above, silence would be optimal in two scenarios: (1) the
potential disclosure would have nonexistent or negligible
informational value, such that even moderate marginal costs
inevitably would exceed the marginal benefits of disclosure; or (2)
despite its informational value, the potential disclosure would be so
costly to accomplish that its marginal costs would exceed its
marginal benefits. The first scenario is inapplicable here because a
reasonable investor would likely consider information about the
relative competitiveness of a company’s products to be significant
when making an investment decision, regardless of whether
expressed as an opinion or as a statement of fact. Therefore, the
inquiry should proceed under the second scenario, centering on the
whether the marginal costs of making this disclosure (either as an
opinion or as a statement or fact) would exceed the marginal benefits.
Assuming that the optimal decision under Decision A is disclosure,
the issuer must proceed to the subsidiary Decision B. As discussed
above, disclosure as an opinion rather than as a statement of fact is
the optimal choice in two scenarios: (1) the informational value of
the disclosure would actually be enhanced by its expression as an
opinion rather than as a statement of fact; or (2) the costs of attaining
the level of certainty required to express the disclosure as statement a
fact rather than as an opinion would be so great that the marginal
costs of the disclosure would exceed its marginal benefits if so
expressed. The first scenario is inapplicable here because the
informational value of a disclosure about the relative resolution of the
company’s products would not be enhanced by its expression as a
statement of opinion rather than a statement of fact. The subject
matter is not inherently uncertain or subjective. Nor does the
informational value of the disclosure emanate from the speaker’s
state of mind itself—investors would care about the TVs’ relative
resolution, not the CEO’s belief about the relative resolution.
Therefore, the inquiry should proceed under the second scenario,
focusing on whether the costs of attaining certainty about the TVs’
relative resolution would exceed the marginal benefits of expressing
the statement with certainty.

36. Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. at 1326.
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II. PRESSURES ON ISSUERS’ DISCLOSURE FRAMEWORK

When an issuer is facing Decision A (whether to remain silent or
disclose) and the subsidiary Decision B (whether to disclose as an
opinion or as a statement of fact), there are five primary sources of
pressure affecting the issuer’s disclosure decisions, which might not
be calibrated to ensure that the issuer makes optimal choices: (1)
market forces; (2) direct and indirect costs of disclosure; (3) risk
from inaccuracy or misleading incompleteness; (4) risk from
nondisclosure; and (5) risk from violating a mandated form of
disclosure. The first three pressures affect both Decisions A and B;
the fourth affects only Decision A; and the fifth affects only Decision
B.
The strength of these competing pressures, and thus the issuer’s
resultant disclosure decisions, vary depending on the disclosure at
issue. Most importantly, these pressures play out quite differently if
the potential disclosure at issue is mandatory under SEC rules rather
than voluntary.
Finally, if these competing pressures result in non-optimal
disclosure choices by issuers, all but the first pressure (market forces)
can be adjusted in order to incentivize optimal decision-making.
A. Pressures Affecting Issuers’ Disclosure Decisions
1. Market Forces

Market forces affect both Decisions A and B, incentivizing issuers
to disclose rather than remain silent and to disclose as a statement of
fact rather than as an opinion. These pressures can be depicted
pictorially as follows:
Market Forces

Decision A

Decision B
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Market forces incentivize issuers to disclose rather than remain
silent. Absent disclosure, both at the time of issuance and on an
ongoing basis, investors may not invest in a firm’s securities at all or
will discount those securities because of the lack of information.37
The Omnicare Court explained this impact as follows: “Sellers
(whether of stock or other items) have strong economic incentives to
. . . well, sell (i.e., hawk or peddle). Those market-based forces push
back against any inclination to underdisclose.”38
By extension, market forces also incentivize issuers to make their
disclosures more meaningful to investors.
With respect to
disclosures whose informational value is heightened by expressing
them with certainty, investors will reward issuers who make those
disclosures as statements of fact rather than as opinions.
Recognizing this incentivizing effect, Justice Scalia, in his Omnicare
concurrence, dismissed the notion that issuers might express matters
about which they are experts—such as cash on hand or the number of
shares of common stock outstanding—as opinions rather than as
statements of fact: “But of course a registration statement would
never preface such items, within the expertise of the management,
with a ‘we believe that.’”39 Consistent with the intuitive notion that
investors value certainty in disclosure, finance research using textual
analysis shows that a firm’s usage of fewer uncertain words (like
“believe”)40 is correlated with a more positive market reaction.41
2. Issuer Costs of Disclosure

The direct and indirect costs of disclosure42 impose countervailing
pressures on Decisions A and B, incentivizing issuers to remain silent
rather than to disclose and, if disclosing, to do so in the form of an
opinion rather than a statement of fact. Issuers can avoid disclosure
costs altogether by remaining silent. If disclosing, however, issuers
37. See Palmiter, supra note 15, at 6 (“[I]ssuers in public offerings often disclose information
voluntarily beyond that required so as to increase investor confidence.”); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra
note 18, at 684 (“A firm that wants the highest possible price when it issues stock must take all costjustified steps to make the stock valuable in the aftermarket, so it must make a believable pledge to
continue disclosing.”).
38. Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. at 1332.
39. Id. at 1335.
40. Tim Loughran & Bill McDonald, 66 J. OF FIN. 35, 45 (2011) (creating a list of 285 words
used in 10-Ks “denoting uncertainty, with emphasis on the general notion of imprecision rather than
exclusively focusing on risk”); see Tim Loughran & Bill McDonald, Master Dictionary,
http://www3.nd.edu/~mcdonald/Word_Lists.html (including “believe” as an uncertain word).
41. Id. at 55 (“Firms using fewer negative, uncertain, modal strong, and modal weak words
realize a more positive reaction from the market in the filing date event window.”).
42. See, supra, notes 15-17.
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can lessen many of these costs (such as the costs of compilation and
the degree of competitive disadvantage) by expressing disclosures
with less certainty, as opinions rather than as statements of fact.43
Disclosure Costs

Decision A

Issuers'
Disclosure
Framework

Remain silent

Disclose
As an
opinion

Decision B

As a statement
of fact

3. Risk from Inaccuracy or Misleading Incompleteness

A third pressure affecting both Decisions A and B is the risk
associated with inaccurate or misleadingly incomplete disclosure.
This risk arises from the potential for liability and from the specter of
SEC review. This pressure can be depicted pictorially as follows:
Risk from Inaccuracy
or Misleading
Incompleteness

Decision A

Decision B

Issuers'
Disclosure
Framework

Remain silent

Disclose
As an
opinion

As a statement
of fact

43. See Sudip Gupta & Ryan D. Israelsen, Hard and Soft Information: Firm Disclosure, SEC
Letters,
and
the
JOBS
Act,
at
1
(2015),
https://www.rhsmith.umd.edu/files/Documents/Centers/CFP/pastconfpapers/ipo_jobs_act_041215.pdf
(“While hard information is typically more credible than soft information, it is normally more costly to
produce and disseminate.”).
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a. Liability Risk from Inaccuracy or Misleading Incompleteness

With respect to Decision A, the risk of civil liability for inaccurate
or misleadingly incomplete disclosure incentivizes issuers to remain
silent rather than voluntarily disclose information.44 By choosing to
speak, an issuer faces the potential for liability if the disclosure is
inaccurate or misleadingly incomplete.
Key liability provisions45 include §§ 11, 12(a)(2), and 17(a)(2) of
the Securities Act and § 10(b) of the Exchange Act (including Rule
10b-5 promulgated thereunder), which potentially impose civil
liability on issuers for (1) making an untrue statement of material
fact;46 or (2) failing to disclose a material fact necessary to make
other disclosures not misleading.47 Although these causes of action
share a common core of imposing liability for inaccurate or
misleadingly incomplete disclosure, their elements and availability
differ to some degree. Securities Act § 11 imposes strict liability on
issuers for inaccurate or misleadingly incomplete statements in

44. E.g., Wendy Gerwick Couture, The Collision Between the First Amendment and Securities
Fraud, 65 ALA. L. REV. 903, 966–67 (2014) (describing how, in light of the newfound potential for
liability under § 11, credit rating agencies refused to consent to the inclusion of credit ratings in
registration statements for asset-backed securities).
45. Note that, in addition to these provisions, § 13(a) and § 15(d) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78m(a) (2012) & 78o(d) (2010), and the rules promulgated thereunder, which mandate the filing of
periodic reports, may impose an “implicit truthfulness requirement” that is independently actionable by
the SEC. SEC v. Jensen, 835 F.3d 1100, 1113 (9th Cir. 2016). Rule 12b-20 explicitly provides the SEC
with a cause of action for misleadingly incomplete disclosures in periodic reports. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b–
20 (1965).
46. § 11(a) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1998) (imposing liability if a registration
statement “contained an untrue statement of material fact”); § 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. §
77l(a)(2) (2000) (imposing liability if a prospectus or related oral communication “includes an untrue
statement of a material fact”); § 17(a)(2) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2) (2000) (making it
unlawful “to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material fact”); § 10(b) of
the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2010) (prohibiting “any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance”); Rule 10b-5(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (1951) (making it unlawful “to make any untrue
statement of material fact”).
47. § 11(a) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1998) (imposing liability if a registration
statement “omitted to state a material fact . . . necessary to make the statements therein not misleading”);
§ 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(2) (2000) (imposing liability if a prospectus or
related oral communication “omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements, in
the light of the circumstances in which they were made, not misleading”); § 17(a)(2) of the Securities
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2) (2000) (making it unlawful “to obtain money or property by means of . . .
any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading”); § 10(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §
78j(b) (2010) (prohibiting “any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance”); Rule 10b-5(b), 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (1951) (making it unlawful “to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading”).
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registration statements.48 Securities Act § 12(a)(2) imposes strict
liability on issuers for inaccurate or misleadingly incomplete
statements in prospectuses, subject to a “reasonable care” defense,49
which translates into a quasi-negligence standard.50 Securities Act §
17(a)(2) imposes liability on issuers for negligently making
inaccurate or misleadingly incomplete statements in the offer or sale
of securities.51 Rule 10b-5, which has a scienter element,52 imposes
liability on issuers for inaccurate or misleadingly incomplete
statements in connection with any securities transaction.53 Injured
investors have a private right of action under Securities Act §§ 1154
and 12(a)(2)55 and under Rule 10b-5,56 while Securities Act §
17(a)(2) is enforceable only by the SEC.57 These different, but often
overlapping, liability provisions incentivize silence over disclosure;
only by speaking does an issuer risk liability for inaccurate or
misleadingly incomplete speech.
With respect to Decision B, the risk of liability for inaccurate or
misleadingly incomplete disclosure also incentivizes issuers to
express disclosures in the form of opinions rather than statements of
fact. There are three key reasons why disclosures expressed as
opinions rather than as statements of fact are more insulated from
liability under the above provisions: (1) disclosures expressed as
opinions are less likely to be actionable as untrue statements of
48. § 11 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1998); Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459
U.S. 375, 382 (1983) (“Liability [under § 11] against the issuer of a security is virtually absolute, even
for innocent misstatements.”).
49. § 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(2) (2000).
50. 2 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 7:45 (“It is
clear that section 12(a)(2)’s requirement of “reasonable care” imparts some sort of negligence standard
and that it is not necessary for the purchaser to show any type of scienter on the seller’s part.”).
51. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 697 (1980) (“It is our view, in sum, that the language of § 17(a)
requires scienter under § 17(a)(1), but not under § 17(a)(2) or § 17(a)(3).”); SEC v. Dain Rauscher, Inc.,
254 F.3d 852, 856 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Violations of Sections 17(a)(2) and (3) require a showing of
negligence.”).
52. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201 (1976).
53. Rule 10b-517, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (applying to any communication “in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security”).
54. § 11(a) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1998) (granting a private right of action to
“any person acquiring such security”).
55. § 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(2) (2000) (granting a private right of
action to “the person purchasing such security from him”).
56. Superintendent of Ins. of State of N. Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9
(1971) (“It is now established that a private right of action is implied under § 10(b).”).
57. Finkel v. Stratton Corp., 962 F.2d 169, 175 (2d Cir. 1992) (“Given that nothing in the
language or history of the section suggests a different mental state requirement for private and SEC
actions under § 17(a), the lack of any evidence of Congressional intent to create a private right of action,
and the overwhelming trend in our sister circuits, we conclude that there is no private right of action
under § 17(a).”).
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material fact; (2) disclosures expressed as opinions have a narrower
pathway to omissions liability for misleading incompleteness; and (3)
disclosures expressed as opinions are less likely to be material. Each
of these reasons is addressed in turn.
The first liability pathway under these provisions is premised on an
issuer’s making an untrue statement of material fact. In Omnicare,
the Supreme Court clarified that a statement of opinion only qualifies
as an untrue statement of material fact if it is disbelieved by the
speaker.58 The Court explained that a statement of opinion
“explicitly affirms one fact: that the speaker actually holds the stated
belief.”59
Although Omnicare addressed liability for alleged
misrepresentations in registration statements under Securities Act §
11, its reasoning applies equally to liability under Securities Act §§
12(a)(2) and 17(a)(2) and under Rule 10b-5, at least to the extent
these claims are premised on disclosures in registration statements or
other SEC filings like periodic reports.60 As a result of this
Omnicare holding, disclosures expressed as opinions are less likely
to be actionable as untrue statements of material fact. The disbelief
requirement adds a scienter element to Securities Act § 11 claims,
which are otherwise strict liability claims; it raises the mental state
element in Securities Act § 12(a)(2) and § 17(a)(2) claims from
negligence to disbelief; and it raises the applicable scienter level for
Rule 10b-5 claims from recklessness61 to disbelief.62
The second liability pathway under these provisions is premised on
an issuer’s failure to disclose a material fact necessary to make other
58. Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. at 1327 (“[A] sincere statement of pure opinion is not an ‘untrue
statement of material fact.’”).
59. Id. at 1326.
60. See, e.g., City of Dearborn Heights Act 345 Police & Fire Retirement Sys. v. Align
Technology, Inc., 856 F.3d 605, 616 (9th Cir. 2017) (“Although Omnicare concerned Section 11 claims,
we conclude that the Supreme Court’s reasoning is equally applicable to Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
claims.”); see also Hillary A. Sale & Donald C. Langevoort, “We Believe”: Omnicare, Legal Risk
Disclosure and Corporate Governance, 66 DUKE L.J. 763, 781-782 (2016) (citing case law) (reasoning
that, because of the textual similarities between § 11 and Rule 10b-5 and because “[r]easonable
investors are unlikely to read registration statements and 10-Ks very differently,” Omnicare’s rulings
likely apply to Rule 10b-5 claims premised on SEC filings); Couture, False Statements, supra note 22,
at 355 (citing case law) (concluding that, based on the textual similarities between § 11 and Rule 10b-5,
Omnicare’s rulings likely apply equally to actions under Rule 10b-5).
61. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 319 n.3 (2007) (“We have
previously reserved the question whether reckless behavior is sufficient for civil liability under § 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 . . . Every Court of Appeals that has considered the issue has held that a plaintiff may
meet the scienter requirement by showing that the defendant acted intentionally or recklessly, though the
Circuits differ on the degree of recklessness required . . . The question whether and when recklessness
satisfies the scienter requirement is not presented in this case.”).
62. Couture, Opinions, supra note 35, at 394–95 (“The subjective falsity requirement, when
applied, effectively raises the applicable scienter level. Both subjective falsity and scienter address the
defendant's state of mind when making the allegedly false statement.”).
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disclosures not misleading. Whether an issuer’s omission of a
material fact is actionable depends on what a reasonable investor
“would naturally understand a statement to convey beyond its literal
meaning.”63 When the statement at issue is a statement of fact,
“representations that state the truth only so far as it goes, while
omitting critical qualifying information—can be actionable
misrepresentations.”64 When the statement at issue is a statement of
opinion, the omissions pathway is narrower, focusing solely on the
basis for the issuer’s opinion. A plaintiff must “identify particular
(and material) facts going to the basis for the issuer’s opinion—facts
about the inquiry the issuer did or did not conduct or the knowledge
it did or did not have—whose omission makes the opinion statement
at issue misleading to a reasonable person reading the statement
fairly and in context.”65 Therefore, disclosures expressed as opinions
are less likely to give rise to omissions liability, even though both
statements of opinion and statements of fact can give rise to
omissions liability if they are misleadingly incomplete.
Finally, these provisions impose liability only to the extent that an
alleged misrepresentation or omission is material.66 As defined by
the Supreme Court, a fact is material if “there is a substantial
likelihood that a reasonable [investor] would consider it important”
in making an investment decision.67 In another articulation, there
must be a substantial likelihood that the fact would have been viewed
by a reasonable investor as “having significantly altered the ‘total
mix’ of information made available.”68 Because a statement of
opinion conveys a degree of uncertainty not present in a statement of
fact, it is less likely that a reasonable investor would consider the
opinion itself, or its basis, to be significant in making an investment
decision.69 Indeed, courts routinely characterize statements of
opinion as “mere puffery” and dismiss liability claims premised
thereon because the alleged misrepresentations are immaterial as a
matter of law.70
63. Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. at 1332.
64. Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 2000 (2016) (citing Matrixx
Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 563 U.S. 27, 44 (2011)).
65. Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. at 1332.
66. § 11(a) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1998); § 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act, 15
U.S.C. § 77l(a)(2) (2000); § 17(a)(2) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2) (2000); Rule 10b-5(b),
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1951).
67. Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. at 1333 (quoting TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438,
449 (1976)).
68. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 232 (1988) (quoting TSC Industries, 426 U.S. at 449).
69. See Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. at 1326 (explicitly adding the caveat that an alleged opinion is only
actionable “assuming the misrepresentation were material”).
70. Couture, Opinions, supra note 35, at 421-22 (providing examples).
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b. SEC Review Risk from Inaccuracy or Misleading
Incompleteness

The SEC review and comment process also poses a risk associated
with inaccurate or misleadingly incomplete disclosure, incentivizing
issuers to remain silent rather than disclose information and, if
disclosing, to express statements with uncertainty.
The SEC staff in the Division of Corporation Finance selectively
reviews registration statements and periodic reports for accuracy,
among other things.71 For example, the SEC staff has flagged
apparently inaccurate disclosures about the par value of outstanding
shares,72 the effects of an alternative methodology of accounting,73
the potential for dilution,74 and even the company’s phone number.75
If the SEC staff identifies an inaccurate or misleadingly incomplete
disclosure, it issues a comment letter regarding the deficiency.76 The
comment letter begins a dialogue with the company, which continues
until either the company convinces the SEC staff that the disclosure
is accurate or the company revises the disclosure.77 Registration
statements are not effective until this process is resolved, which can
result in significant delay or even cancellation of an offering because
of “adverse changes in market conditions.”78 Although periodic
71. SEC,
Division
of
Corporation
Finance,
Filing
Review
Process,
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cffilingreview.htm; see also Zahn Bozanic, J. Richard Dietrich &
Bret A. Johnson, SEC Comment Letters and Firm Disclosure, at 31 (June 2017) (forthcoming in the
Journal of Accounting and Public Policy), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2989164
(finding that comment letters are associated with a decrease in optimistic tone).
72. Nuance Resources Corp., SEC Staff Comment Letter, 2007 WL 9400212 (June 13, 2007)
(“However, recording the debit to capital in the manner depicted appears to yield an inaccurate figure
for the par value associated with the number of shares outstanding.”).
73. Gol Intelligent Airlines Inc., SEC Staff Comment Letter, 2007 WL 9390615 (Feb. 16, 2007)
(“Also, you state that the alternative method results in more expense being recorded earlier in the lease
and less expense being recorded later in the lease. This is not an accurate description of the effects of the
alternative method, which would be most accurately described as resulting in expense being recognized
in proportion to the use of the aircraft.”).
74. Shimoda Marketing, Inc., SEC Staff Comment Letter, 2007 WL 9401298 (Apr. 21, 2006)
(“Disclosure states that there will be an immediate decrease to new investors of $0.78 per share if
600,000 shares are sold in the primary offering. Thus, the statement ‘For our company there would be
no dilution to new shareholders, only an immediate increase in the value per share as shown in table 3.0’
is inaccurate. Please revise.”).
75. Health Partnership, Inc., SEC Staff Comment Letter, 2006 WL 8239219 (June 3, 2005)
(“Revise the cover page to provide the company’s correct telephone number. The number listed appears
to be inaccurate.”).
76. SEC,
Division
of
Corporation
Finance,
Filing
Review
Process,
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cffilingreview.htm.
77. Id.
78. Vijay Sekhon, Efficient Access to Public Capital, 40 SEC. REG. L.J. 463, 463 (2012); see also
WGL ACCT. & REP. MANUAL § 3.27 (2017) (“A significant factor in the process is whether the time
required to resolve an issue in favor of the company will significantly delay the offering, with the
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reports are effective despite an ongoing SEC comment process, the
process imposes remediation costs.79 In addition, because SEC
comments are publicly disclosed upon their resolution,80 they may
unsettle investors or highlight previous deficiencies to investors.81
Finally, in the event that the staff and company are unable to resolve
an alleged inaccuracy in a periodic report, the SEC staff refers the
matter to the Division of Enforcement for potential further action,
triggering liability risk associated with the inaccuracy or misleading
incompleteness.82
On occasion, the SEC staff has identified disclosures expressed as
statements of fact and requested that, in order to ensure accuracy,
they be revised to statements of opinion.83 The SEC staff has also
occasionally requested that the issuer clarify whether a disclosure is
an opinion or a statement of fact.84 Finally, although statements of
opinion are more immune to charges of inaccuracy than statements of
fact, the SEC staff frequently issues comment letters requesting that
companies provide the basis for asserted opinions.85
possibility that the offering will commence in a fading market.”).
79. Cory A. Cassell, Lauren M. Dreher & Linda A. Myers, Reviewing the SEC’s Review
Process: 10-K Comment Letters and the Cost of Remediation, 88 ACCT. REV. 1875 (2013) (identifying
remediation costs of “internal resources, such as internal staff diverted from their normal activities, and
external resources, such as auditor and lawyer fees”).
80. SEC
Division
of
Corporation
Finance,
Filing
Review
Process,
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cffilingreview.htm.
81. See Patricia M. Dechow, Alastair Lawrence & James Ryans, SEC Comment Letters and
Insider Sales, 91 ACCT. REV. 401, 402 (2016) (finding a negative stock negative price response to the
public release of SEC comment letters about revenue recognition).
82. See Bozanic, Dietrich & Johnson, supra note 71, at 3.
83. E.g., Typhoon Tunes Inc., SEC Staff Comment Letter, 2006 WL 8245107 (March 20, 2006)
(“It appears that many of the statements in this section [about the background of the industry of music
distribution] are matters of opinion, rather than fact. Please revise to eliminate such statements, or to
characterize them as opinion.”); Gencorp Inc., SEC Staff Comment Letter, 2006 WL 8231449 (March
10, 2006) (“We reissue comment 7 with respect to your disclosure (about the reasons for the
solicitation) that the company has engaged in ‘value-destroying initiatives.’ Please revise your
disclosure to clarify that the assertion is, in fact, your opinion or belief.”); World Monitor Trust III.,
SEC Staff Comment Letter, 2006 WL 8232013 (Jan. 26, 2005) (“Please have counsel revise paragraph 2
to clarify that the description under the caption ‘Federal Income Tax Consequences’ in fact constitutes
its opinion.”).
84. E.g., Inland Monthly Income Yield Fund II, L.P., SEC Staff Comment Letter, 2006 WL
8231309 (Aug. 12, 2005) (“We note your disclosure that you do not believe the partnership agreement
should restrict transfers of securities pursuant to the offer. Please clarify whether this is an opinion or a
statement of fact.”).
85. E.g., Infousa Inc., SEC Staff Comment Letter, 2006 WL 8246455 (Apr. 19, 2006) (“Support
for opinions or beliefs should be self-evident, disclosed in the proxy materials or provided to the staff on
a supplemental basis. The bases for many of the opinions you set forth in the proxy materials referenced
above are not self-evident and are not disclosed. Accordingly, and with a view toward additional
disclosure, for each claim you are making in this document, please state each claim as a belief and
provide the staff with annotated materials adequately supporting each such belief.”); Techprecision
Corp., SEC Staff Comment Letter, 2007 WL 9408925 (Oct. 11, 2006) (“Provide the basis for the
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4. Risk from Nondisclosure

A fourth pressure affecting Decision A is the risk associated with
nondisclosure, thus incentivizing disclosure. This risk has three
potential sources: (1) direct liability risk if there is omissions liability
for nondisclosure; (2) indirect liability risk if nondisclosure heightens
the likelihood that other disclosures will give rise to liability; and (3)
SEC review risk from nondisclosure of mandated information. This
pressure can be depicted pictorially as follows:
Risk From Nondisclosure
Issuers'
Disclosure
Framework

Decision A

Decision B

Remain silent

Disclose
As an
opinion

As a statement
of fact

a. Direct Liability Risk from Nondisclosure

Silence, absent a duty to disclose, is not actionable.86 But, if an
issuer has a duty to disclose and remains silent, the issuer faces
potential liability under Securities Act §§ 11, 12(a)(2), and 17(a)(2)
(in the context of an offering) and under Rule 10b-5 (in the context of
any securities transaction). If the issuer is has a duty to disclose, the
potential liability risk for nondisclosure incentivizes the issuer to
speak. Two sources of disclosure duties are especially applicable
statement on page 21 that ‘We believe that there is an increasing demand for our services and we see
that demand increasing at least in the near term, notwithstanding the decline in revenue from the quarter
ended June 30, 2005 to the quarter ended June 30, 2006.’”); Stirling Acquisition Corp., SEC Staff
Comment Letter, 2007 WL 9408915 (June 13, 2007) (“Please explain the basis for the second part of the
following statement or remove it: ‘We cannot predict whether a future acquisition will dilute the net
tangible book value of our shares, but we believe such an outcome is unlikely.’”); Dynamic Leisure
Corp., SEC Staff Comment Letter, 2007 WL 9398000 (Jan. 25, 2007) (“Please provide us with the basis
for the following statement in the first paragraph on page 35: ‘Our agreements with leading airlines,
allow us to offer consumers what we believe to be the largest selection of low fares generally available
to the public.’ Alternatively, delete.”).
86. Basic, 485 U.S. at 239 n.17.
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here: (1) misleadingly incomplete disclosures, and (2) mandatory
disclosure rules.
First, as discussed above,87 if an issuer’s other statements are
misleadingly incomplete because they omit a material fact necessary
to make the disclosures not misleading, the issuer has a duty to
disclose. In other words, “[e]ven when there is no existing
independent duty to disclose information, once a company speaks on
an issue or topic, there is a duty to tell the whole truth.”88 Therefore,
the risk of omissions liability premised on the failure to tell the whole
truth incentives companies to comprehensively discuss chosen topics.
Second, mandatory disclosure rules give rise to an actionable duty
to disclose.89 The SEC heavily regulates the contents of registration
statements, annual reports, quarterly reports, and current reports,90
incorporating the specific disclosure rules contained in Regulations
S-K and S-X.91 To the extent an issuer is considering whether to
disclose information that the SEC mandates, the liability risk
associated with nondisclosure incentivizes disclosure.
Notably, there is currently a circuit court split about the degree to
which an issuer’s failure to comply with one disclosure rule–the
Management Discussion and Analysis (“MD&A”) required by Item
303 of Regulation S-K–gives rise to a duty to disclose that is
potentially actionable under Rule 10b-5.92 Assuming this issue is
eventually resolved by the Supreme Court,93 a holding that Item 303
in particular or SEC disclosure rules more broadly do not give rise to
a potentially actionable duty to disclose would significantly lessen
87. See, supra, Part II.A.3.a.
88. Meyer v. Jinkosolar Holdings Co., 761 F.3d 245, 250 (2d Cir. 2014).
89. Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley, 776 F.3d 94, 102 (2d Cir. 2015) (citing authority) (“This
Court and our sister circuits have long recognized that a duty to disclose under Section 10(b) can derive
from statutes or regulations that obligate a party to speak.”); In re Morgan Stanley Info. Fund Sec.
Litig., 592 F.3d 347, 360 (2d Cir. 2010) (“Collectively, the language of sections 11 and 12(a)(2) creates
three potential bases for liability based on registration statements and prospectuses filed with the SEC:
(1) a misrepresentation; (2) an omission in contravention of an affirmative legal disclosure obligation;
and (3) an omission of information that is necessary to prevent existing disclosures from being
misleading.”).
90. E.g., 17 C.F.R. § 239.11 (2014) (Form S-1); id. § 240.13a–13 (2016) (Form 10-Q); id. §
240.15d-13 (2016) (Form 10-Q); id. § 249.308a (2015) (Form 10-Q); id. § 240.13a-1 (1997) (Form 10K); id. § 240.15d-1 (1996) (Form 10-K); id. § 249.310 (2015) (Form 10-K); id. § 240.13a-11 (2016)
(Form 8-K); id. § 240.15d-11 (2016) (Form 8-K); id. § 249.308 (2016) (Form 8-K).
91. 17 C.F.R. Part 229 (2012) (Regulation S-K); 17 C.F.R. Part 210 (2011) (Regulation S-X).
92. Compare Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 100 (“We conclude, as a matter of first impression in
this Court, that a failure to make a required Item 303 disclosure in a 10-Q filing is indeed an omission
that can serve as the basis for a Section 10(b) securities fraud claim.”), with In re NVIDIA Corp. Sec.
Litig., 768 F.3d 1046, 1054 (9th Cir. 2014) (“We have never directly decided whether Item 303’s
disclosure duty is actionable under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. We now hold that it is not.”).
93. See Leidos, Inc. v. Indiana Pub. Ret. Sys., 137 S. Ct. 1395 (2017) (granting certiorari on this
issue), cert. dismissed, 138 S. Ct. 2670 (2018).
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the pressure on issuers from the risk of liability for nondisclosure.
b. Indirect Liability Risk from Nondisclosure

Issuers may also be incentivized by the liability risk associated
with other disclosures to make additional voluntary disclosures (even
if those other disclosures are not misleadingly incomplete, which
would make additional disclosures mandatory rather than voluntary).
For example, in order to take advantage of the safe harbor from
liability for forward-looking statements, companies must accompany
those statements with meaningful cautionary language.94 Therefore,
in order to alleviate the liability risk associated with forward-looking
statements, companies are incentivized to make additional voluntary,
cautionary disclosures.95 Indeed, before requiring companies to
make risk factor disclosures in periodic reports, the SEC recognized
that many issuers were nonetheless doing so voluntarily in order to
alleviate the liability risk associated with other statements.96 The
strength of this incentive to voluntarily disclose depends on the
degree of litigation risk that a company faces.97
c. SEC Review Risk from Nondisclosure

The SEC review process described above98 also encompasses a
review of whether an issuer has complied with mandatory disclosure
rules.99 For example, the SEC staff has flagged the apparent
omission of an audit report,100 of one segment from total segment
adjusted EBITDA,101 and even of mandatory parentheticals within
94. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2(c)(2); id. § 78u-5(c)(2)(A).
95. Karen K. Nelson & A. C. Pritchard, Carrot or Stick? The Shift from Voluntary to Mandatory
Disclosure of Risk Factors, 13 J. OF EMPIR. LEGAL STUD. 266, 267 (2016) (“Thus, the safe harbor
provides an important incentive for public companies to disclose risk factors.”).
96. Securities Offering Reform, SEC Release No. 34-52056 (Aug. 3, 2005) (“Issuers may
already include risk factor disclosure in their Exchange Act reports for varying reasons, including to
take advantage of the safe harbor for forward-looking statements in Securities Act Section 27A and the
‘bespeaks caution’ defense developed through case law.”).
97. Nelson & Pritchard, supra note 95, at 267 (finding that, during the period when risk factor
disclosure was voluntary, “firms with greater litigation risk provide[d] more risk factor disclosure”).
98. See, supra, Part II.A.3.b.
99. SEC,
Division
of
Corporation
Finance,
Filing
Review
Process,
at
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cffilingreview.htm.
100. Carolyn River Projects Ltd., SEC Staff Comment Letter, 2007 WL 9402393 (Dec. 19, 2005)
(“We note that the independent auditor's report for the period covering from inception to the period
ended May 31, 2004 has been omitted from the registration statement. You must include an audit report
for each period for which financial statements are required. A reference to the report is not sufficient.”).
101. Patriot Coal Corp., SEC Staff Comment Letter, 2007 WL 9404749 (Oct. 2, 2007) (“We note
that you have included totals of your segment adjusted EBITDA for all periods presented for certain
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Section 1350 certifications.102 Therefore, the risk that the SEC will
initiate the comment process with respect to an omitted mandatory
disclosure, thus imposing costs, incentivizes disclosure of
information required by SEC rules.
5. Risk from Violating a Mandated Form of Disclosure

Although the SEC routinely regulates the form of disclosures in
some respects, such as requiring certain disclosures to be expressed
in “plain English,”103 it has only occasionally wielded this tool to
affect issuers’ decisions about whether to express disclosures as
opinions or as statements of fact. To the extent that the SEC so
regulates disclosures, however, this pressure affects issuers’ Decision
B. This potential pressure can be depicted pictorially as follows:
Risk From Violating
a Mandated Form of
Disclosure

Decision A

Decision B

Issuers'
Disclosure
Framework

Remain silent

Disclose
As an
opinion

As a statement
of fact

A few mandatory disclosure provisions mandate, not only the
content of disclosure, but also the form of disclosure. For example,
the instructions to Item 404(a) of Regulation S-K, which requires the
segments, including a reconciliation of this non-GAAP measure to net income. It appears you have
omitted one of your segments to arrive at your total Segment Adjusted EBITDA. Please modify your
presentation of total Segment Adjusted EBITDA to include all segments you have identified and adjust
your reconciliation to Net Income accordingly.”).
102. Hallwood Group Inc., SEC Staff Comment Letter, 2007 WL 9402622 (Sept. 27, 2007) (“The
certifications required by Rule 13a-14(a) or Rule 15d-14(a) should conform exactly to the certification
set forth in Item 601(b)(31) of Regulation S-K. In that regard, please revise paragraph 4(d) in future
filings to include the reference to the most recent fiscal quarter as opposed to the fourth fiscal quarter
and insert the parenthetical language presently omitted. The parenthetical language should also be
included in future filings on Form 10-Q.”).
103. Securities Act Rule 423(d), 17 C.F.R. § 230.423(d) (2011); Plain English Disclosure, SEC
Release No. 33-7497 (Jan. 28, 1998); SEC, A Plain English Handbook: How to create clear SEC
disclosure documents (Aug. 1998).
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disclosure of transactions with related persons, provide the following
guidance for certain related-person transactions involving
indebtedness:
[D]isclosure under paragraph (a) of this Item may consist of a
statement, if such is the case, that the loans to such persons:
i. Were made in the ordinary course of business;
ii. Were made on substantially the same terms, including
interest rates and collateral, as those prevailing at the time for
comparable loans with persons not related to the lender; and
iii. Did not involve more than the normal risk of collectibility
or present other unfavorable features.104
The SEC staff has interpreted this instruction as mandating that
these Item 404(a) disclosures be expressed as statements of fact. For
instance, in the first version of its registration statement, Buckhead
Community Bankcorp Inc. expressed these disclosures105 as opinions:
In the opinion of management all loans and commitments to
extend loans included in such transactions were made in the
ordinary course of business substantially on the same terms,
including interest rates and collateral, as those prevailing from
time to time on comparable transactions with unaffiliated
persons; are not such as are required to be classified as nonaccrual, past due, restructured or creating potential problems;
and do not involve more than a normal risk of collectibility or
present any other unfavorable features. In management’s
opinion, the amount of extensions of credit outstanding at any
time from the beginning of the last fiscal year to date to a
director, executive officer or principal security holder and their
associates, individually or in the aggregate, did not exceed the
maximum permitted under applicable banking regulations.106
The SEC staff issued a comment letter requesting revision because
the “representation required by Instruction 4.c to Item 404 . . . should

104. 17 C.F.R. § 229.404 (2012).
105. Buckhead Community Bankcorp Inc. made these disclosures pursuant to Item 404 of
Regulation S-B, 17 C.F.R. § 228.404, which was effective from November 7, 2006 to March 14, 2009
and which has since been repealed and integrated into Regulation S-K. Smaller Reporting Co.
Regulatory Relief & Simplification, Release No. 2451; 34-56994 (Dec. 19, 2007). The relevant
instructions remain identical, however.
106. Buckhead Community Bancorp Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-4) (June 28, 2007)
(emphasis added).
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be a statement of fact, not opinion.”107 The issuer complied,
amending its registration statement to express these disclosures as
statements of fact:
All loans and commitments to extend loans included in such
transactions were made in the ordinary course of business
substantially on the same terms, including interest rates and
collateral, as those prevailing from time to time on comparable
transactions with unaffiliated persons; are not such as are
required to be classified as non- accrual, past due, restructured
or creating potential problems; and do not involve more than a
normal risk of collectibility or present any other unfavorable
features. The amount of extensions of credit by FNB Forsyth
outstanding at any time from the beginning of the last fiscal year
to date to a director, executive officer or principal security
holder and their associates, individually or in the aggregate, did
not exceed the maximum permitted under applicable banking
regulations.108
Therefore, on the rare occasions in which SEC rules require
disclosure in a certain form (either as an opinion or as a statement of
fact), the risk associated with the SEC review and comment process
incentivizes issuers to express their disclosures in that mandated
form.
B. Differential Pressures for Voluntary and Mandatory Disclosures

Although the five competing pressures that issuers face vary
depending on the particular disclosure at issue, the most important
variable is whether the disclosure is voluntary or mandatory under
SEC rules. If a disclosure is voluntary (i.e., not mandated by SEC
rules), the risk from nondisclosure is lessened considerably, and the
risk from violating a mandated form of disclosure is non-existent,
rendering the other pressures (market forces, costs of disclosure, and
risk of inaccuracy or misleading incompleteness) more important to
the issuer’s disclosure decision. Conversely, if the disclosure is
mandated by SEC rules, these other competing pressures are less
likely to affect the issuer’s disclosure decision, at least with respect to
Decision A. On the rare occasion that the SEC rules mandate both
107. Buckhead Community Bancorp Inc., SEC Staff Comment Letter, 2007 WL 9401203 (July
27, 2007).
108. Buckhead Community Bancorp Inc., Amendment No. 1 to Registration Statement (Form S4) (Sept. 14, 2007).
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the actual disclosure and the form of that disclosure, these competing
pressures are also less likely to affect Decision B.
Even if a disclosure is mandated by SEC rules, however, the other
pressures (market forces, costs of disclosure, and risk of inaccuracy
or misleading incompleteness) are still potentially impactful.109 For
example, if the risk associated with violating mandatory disclosure
rules is not sufficient to outweigh competing pressures, issuers may
choose to violate the mandate. Indeed, although the SEC amended
the executive compensation disclosure requirements in 2006 to
require expanded narrative disclosure about “how and why a
company arrived at specific executive compensation decisions and
policies,”110 the SEC staff continued to issue a significant number of
comments about deficiencies through 2009.111 In a November 2009
speech, Shelley Parratt, then-Deputy Director of the Division of
Corporation Finance, explained this endemic noncompliance as
follows:
Based on this review, we’re left with one simple conclusion.
The reason for ongoing comments in these areas is not because
companies do not understand the disclosure requirements—to
the contrary, we believe that there is a general understanding of
the rules. Rather, it seems many are reluctant to address these
comment themes until we provide specific comments requesting
enhanced disclosure. Anecdotal evidence suggests the same—
that companies may be disinclined to disclose detailed
compensation information and prepare a rigorous analytical
discussion of compensation practices until we ask them to do so
in a review.112
In other words, under Decision A, despite the pressures
109. See Chair Mary Jo White, Speech, The Path Forward on Disclosure (Oct. 15, 2013),
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch101513mjw (“We should consider all sources that may be
contributing to the length and complexity of disclosure. In some cases, lengthy and complex disclosure
may indeed by the direct result of the Commission’s rules. . . . But, there are other causes too, such as
investor demand or a company’s decision to take a defensive posture and disclose more information
rather than less to reduce the risk of litigation claims that there was insufficient disclosure.”).
110. Report on Review of Disclosure Requirements in Regulation S-K, at 57 (Dec. 2013),
https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2013/reg-sk-disclosure-requirements-review.pdf (discussing the 2006
amendments); see also Executive Compensation & Related Person Disclosure; Final Rule and Proposed
Rule, SEC Release No. 34-54302A (Sept. 8, 2006); Executive Compensation & Related Person
Disclosure, SEC Release No. 34-54302A (Aug. 29, 2006).
111. Shelley Parratt, Speech, Executive Compensation Disclosure: Observations on the 2009
Proxy
Season
and
Expectations
for
2010
(Nov.
9,
2009),
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch110909sp.htm.
112. Id.
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incentivizing compliance with the executive compensation disclosure
requirements (market forces and risk from nondisclosure), companies
chose not to make these disclosures, likely because the competing
pressures (costs of disclosure and risk from inaccuracy or
misleadingly incompleteness) outweighed those pressures.
In
response, Parratt sought to increase the risk associated with
noncompliance by warning: “Any company that waits until it
receives staff comments to comply with the disclosure requirements
should be prepared to amend its filings if we raise material
comments.”113
As another example of the ongoing impact of other pressures
despite an SEC mandate, consider the competing pressures affecting
an issuer’s risk factor disclosures. Because risk factor disclosure is
mandatory, companies face direct liability risk and SEC review risk
associated with nondisclosure. Yet, risk factor disclosure also
lessens the liability risk associated with forward-looking
statements,114 and different firms face different litigation risk. So,
the strength of this additional incentive to disclose risk factors varies
depending on the firm’s litigation risk. Indeed, in an empirical study,
Karen K. Nelson and A. C. Pritchard found that this difference in
litigation risk was impactful despite the mandatory nature of risk
factor disclosure: “We find that firms with high litigation risk
continue to provide significantly more risk factor disclosure in the
mandatory regime.”115
C. Potential Adjustments to Pressures Facing Issuers

The above-identified countervailing pressures affect how issuers
resolve Decision A (whether to remain silent or disclose) and the
subsidiary Decision B (whether to disclose as an opinion or as a
statement of fact). If these pressures are not appropriately calibrated,
issuers may make decisions that are not optimal for society. To the
extent these pressures result in non-optimal choices, adjustments to
these pressures can incentivize optimal behavior. Indeed, Parratt’s
warning to issuers, discussed above,116 is an example of an
adjustment to the risk from nondisclosure, in an effort to affect
Decision A with respect to executive compensation disclosure.
In particular, four potential adjustments to the pressures facing
issuers are available to incentivize optimal behavior: (1) influence
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id.
See, supra, text accompanying notes 94-96.
Nelson & Pritchard, supra note 95, at 268.
See, supra, text accompanying notes 110-113.
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Decisions A and B by adjusting the direct or indirect costs of
disclosure; (2) influence Decisions A and B by adjusting the risk
from inaccurate or misleadingly incomplete disclosure; (3) influence
Decision A by adjusting the risk from nondisclosure; and (4)
influence Decision B by adjusting the risk associated with violating a
mandated form of disclosure.
1. Adjustments to Costs of Disclosure

The direct and indirect costs of disclosure can be adjusted to some
degree, thus affecting Decisions A and B. Lowering disclosure costs
potentially lessens the pressure on issuers to remain silent (Decision
A) and to disclose in the form of opinions (Decision B), while
increasing disclosure costs potentially has countervailing impacts.
For example, standardization of disclosure requirements can “lead to
greater economies of scale in the design of systems for the collection
of such information (such as software systems), increase the size and
mobility of the pool of disclosure professionals available to issuers,
and lead to greater cost competition in service providers, such as
independent auditors.”117 As a consequence, standardization can
potentially lower disclosure costs, affecting Decisions A and B.
2. Adjustments to Risk from Inaccuracy or Misleading Incompleteness

Adjustments to the risk associated with inaccuracy or misleading
incompleteness can likewise affect the pressures on issuers making
Decisions A and B. With respect to liability risk, to the extent that
the risk of liability for inaccuracy or misleading incompleteness is
lessened, issuers are more likely to disclose (Decision A) and to do
so in the form of a statement of fact (Decision B). Conversely, to the
extent that the risk of liability for inaccuracy or misleading
incompleteness is increased, issuers are more likely to remain silent
(Decision A) or, if electing to disclose, to do so in the form of an
opinion (Decision B). With respect to SEC review risk, adjusting the
frequency and comprehensiveness of SEC review for inaccuracy or
misleading incompleteness can likewise affect these incentives.
As an example of adjustment to the liability risk associated with
inaccuracy, Congress enacted a safe harbor in 1995 that protects
companies from private civil liability for certain forward-looking
statements,118 which are a subset of opinions.119 Congress’s stated
117. Franco, supra note 18, at 333.
118. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2(c)(2); id. § 78u-5(c)(2)(A).
119. Couture, Opinions, supra note 35, at 400 (“[A]bsent a crystal ball, any prediction is
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goal was to encourage companies to make forward-looking
statements: “The Conference Committee has adopted a statutory ‘safe
harbor’ to enhance market efficiency by encouraging companies to
disclose forward-looking information.”120 Congress was attempting
to influence Decision A by lessening the liability risk associated with
forward-looking statements, and there is evidence that the lessening
of this pressure induced firms to voluntarily disclose more forwardlooking information. An empirical study of 523 high tech firms
found that firms significantly increased the frequency and number of
forecasts in the year after the safe harbor was enacted and that this
increase was most pronounced for firms that, prior to the enactment,
had relatively higher litigation risk.121
3. Adjustments to Risk from Nondisclosure

Directly or indirectly adjusting the risk associated with
nondisclosure can also affect the pressures on issuers making
Decision A. First, increasing disclosure mandates increases the
pressure on issuers to disclose, both to avoid liability for
nondisclosure and to avoid SEC comments in the review process,
while decreasing disclosure mandates decreases that pressure.
Second, increasing or decreasing the extent to which additional
disclosures (like cautionary language) protect other statements from
liability risk indirectly affects issuers’ incentives to make those
additional disclosures.
Finally, adjusting the frequency,
comprehensiveness, and implications of SEC review for noncompliance with disclosure mandates can likewise affect these
incentives.
As an example of an adjustment to the direct liability risk and the
SEC review risk associated with nondisclosure, the SEC added a new
disclosure mandate in 2005 that requires certain reporting companies
to make risk factor disclosures in their annual reports and to update
those factors to reflect material changes in their quarterly reports.122
Although many companies were already making these disclosures
voluntarily, the SEC mandated these disclosures in order to “further
necessarily subjective, requiring the speaker to infer an unknown fact (i.e., the future) from a known set
of facts (i.e., the present).”).
120. H.R. Conf. Rep. 104-369 (Nov. 29, 1995) (“The Conference Committee has adopted a
statutory “safe harbor” to enhance market efficiency by encouraging companies to disclose forwardlooking information.”).
121. Marilyn F. Johnson, Ron Kasznik & Karen K. Nelson, The Impact of Securities Litigation
Reform on the Disclosure of Forward-Looking Information By High Technology Firms, 39 J. OF ACCT.
RES. 297, 298 (2001).
122. Securities Offering Reform, SEC Release No. 34-52056 p.257-58 (Aug. 3, 2005).
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enhance the contents of Exchange Act reports and their value in
informing investors and the markets.”123 Therefore, the addition of
this disclosure mandate increased the pressure on issuers to disclose
risk factors rather than remain silent.124
As an example of an adjustment to direct liability risk and SEC
review risk in the other direction, Congress enacted the Jumpstart
Our Business Startups Act (“JOBS Act”) in 2012, which lessened the
initial public offering (“IPO”) disclosure requirements for firms
categorized as “emerging growth companies” or “EGCs.”125 Among
other provisions, the JOBS Act permits EGCs to disclose two years
of audited financial statements (rather than three years) and to
disclose two years of selected financial data (rather than five
The JOBS Act reduced the risk associated with
years).126
nondisclosure of this now-voluntary information. Consistent with the
reduction of this pressure on issuers, many EGCs have chosen not to
disclose this information, suggesting that, once the risk from
nondisclosure was reduced, the pressures favoring disclosure of this
information (market forces) were outweighed for these companies by
the pressures favoring nondisclosure (disclosure costs and risk from
inaccuracy or misleading incompleteness).127
As an example of an adjustment to the SEC review risk associated
with nondisclosure, in 2002, Congress mandated enhanced SEC
review of periodic disclosures by issuers.128 Section 408 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act directed the SEC to review issuers’ periodic
disclosures at least once every three years,129 with the purpose of
“promoting compliance with what is largely a voluntary compliance
system.”130 This adjustment to the “watchdog function of the
SEC”131 increased the risk of failing to comply with the SEC’s
123. Id.
124. Nelson & Pritchard, supra note 95, at 268 (concluding that “the SEC’s mandate had a
material effect on the disclosure decisions of companies that had less incentive to provide meaningful
[risk factor] disclosure under the PSLRA’s safe harbor provision alone”).
125. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (“JOBS Act”), Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306,
Title I (b)(1)(A)(a)(2) (Apr. 5, 2012)
126. See Securities Act of 1933 § 7(a)(2)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 77g(a)(2)(A).
127. See Gupta & Israelsen, supra note 43, at 17 (“61 out of 159 chose to report fewer than five
years of selected financial data although almost half of the firms in our sample chose to provide at least
three years of audited financial statements.”); id. (“Taken together, these results suggest that for many
firms, the constraints on the production of hard information prior to the implementation of the JOBS Act
were indeed binding.”).
128. 15 U.S.C. § 7266.
129. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub.L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 790, Title IV, § 408(c) (July 30,
2002) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7266).
130. Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (and It
Just Might Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915, 968 (2003).
131. Id.
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disclosure mandates, thus potentially affecting issuers’ Decision A.
4. Adjustments to Risk Associated with Violating a Mandated Form of
Disclosure

Mandating the form of additional disclosures (either as an opinion
or as a statement of fact), or increasing the likelihood of SEC review
of existing mandated forms of disclosure, could affect the pressures
on issuers when making Decision B. For example, if issuers were
making a non-optimal choice to express certain disclosures as
opinions, the SEC could mandate that those disclosures be expressed
as statements of fact, with that mandate enforced via the SEC review
process. Therefore, although the SEC has only imposed this pressure
on rare occasion,132 it is a potential adjustment tool available if
issuers are making non-optimal choices with respect to Decision B.
III. OMNICARE’S POTENTIAL IMPACTS ON ISSUERS’ DISCLOSURE
FRAMEWORK
A. Omnicare’s Potential Adjustments to Liability Risk from Inaccuracy
or Misleading Incompleteness

In Omnicare, the Supreme Court clarified the liability standards
for statement of opinion. The Court held: (1) an opinion is actionable
as an untrue statement of material fact only if the opinion was
disbelieved by the speaker; and (2) an opinion can give rise to
omissions liability to the extent the issuer fails to disclose a fact
showing that the company lacked the basis for expressing the opinion
that a reasonable investor would expect.133 The cumulative impact of
these holdings on the pressures facing issuers is uncertain because
they are countervailing.
With respect to the first holding, prior to Omnicare, the circuit
courts were split about whether a showing of disbelief was required
for a statement of opinion to be actionable as an untrue statement of
material fact.134 Omnicare clarified that such a showing is indeed
required. This holding, which made it more difficult for a statement
of opinion to be actionable as an untrue statement of fact, had two
potential impacts. First, with respect to Decision A, this holding
potentially lessened the pressure on issuers to remain silent rather
132. See, supra, text accompanying notes 104-108.
133. Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. at 1327, 1332.
134. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Omnicare, Inc. v. The Laborers Dist. Council, No. 13-435,
2013 WL 5532735, at *13-14 (U.S. Oct. 4, 2013) (detailing the Circuit split existing at that time).
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than to disclose in the form of an opinion. Second, with respect to
Decision B, this holding potentially increased the incentive for
issuers to make disclosures as statements of opinion rather than as
statements of fact, in order to insulate those statements from liability.
With respect to the second holding, prior to Omnicare, omissions
liability associated with statements of opinion was not widely
understood to be a separate liability pathway; courts often analyzed
statements of opinion only as allegedly false statements of material
fact.135
Indeed, the lower courts in Omnicare “erroneously
conflat[ed]” the two liability pathways, ignoring the separate
omissions analysis.136 Therefore, although Omnicare clarified only a
narrow pathway whereby opinions can give rise to omissions
liability, it potentially affected Decisions A and B in a countervailing
manner to the first holding. This holding potentially increased the
pressure on issuers to remain silent rather than disclose in the form of
an opinion and potentially decreased the benefit (from a liability
perspective) of expressing a statement as an opinion rather than as a
statement of fact.137
B. Collection of Pre- and Post-Omnicare Opinions

As part of a qualitative assessment of the potential impact of
Omnicare’s holdings on issuer disclosure decisions, I collected 2,549
statements of opinion from the 10-Ks of 30 companies filed
immediately prior and post to Omnicare’s issuance.138 In order to
build this collection of statements of opinion, I followed several
steps.
First, I obtained the 10-K filings, immediately preceding and
immediately following the issuance of Omnicare, of the first 30
companies listed alphabetically in the S&P 100 index, excluding any
companies without both pre- and post-Omnicare 10-Ks.139 I selected
135. Sale & Langevoort, supra note 60, at 775 (“Before Omnicare, many courts assumed that
opinions were fraudulent only if not genuinely believed . . .”).
136. Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. at 1325 n.1.
137. See Sale & Langevoort, supra note 60, at 775 (“Omnicare’s holding that opinions may imply
more than they say thus increases the scope of liability that issuers face.”); James D. Cox, “We’re Cool”
Statements After Omnicare: Securities Fraud Suits for Failures to Comply with the Law, 68 SMU L.
REV. 715, 724 (2015) (“Another significant impact of Omnicare Inc. is that it relieves the plaintiff of the
burden of alleging facts of knowing noncompliance with the law; after Omnicare Inc., the plaintiff can
put into issue that the claim of compliance is baseless in light of pervasive violations, and hence porosity
of the claimed compliance system.”).
138. I excluded amended 10-Ks, focusing instead on the regularly filed 10-Ks immediately before
and after Omnicare’s issuance. A chart identifying each opinion in the collection is posted here:
http://ssrn.com/author=1070964.
139. I used the stocks in the S&P 100 Index as of December 30, 2016. I examined the filings of

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018

33

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 4

620

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 86

large-cap companies because these firms, which tend to have more
sophisticated legal counsel, are consequently more likely to be
immediately responsive to changes in the law.140 The 30 selected
companies represent a broad array of industries, with 20 different
Standard Industrial Classifications (“SIC”) codes.141 The SIC code
with the most representation in the collection (five companies) is
2834—Pharmaceutical Preparations.142 None of these 30 companies
received an SEC staff comment letter with respect to their 10-Ks
filed immediately before or after Omnicare.143
Second, I searched these 60 10-Ks for the following opinion
signals: “opinion,” “believe,” “belief,” “think,” “estimation,” and
“consider.”144 Although these signals do not encompass the entire
world of possible expressions of opinion, they are used extensively
by issuers to indicate statements of opinion.
Third, I exercised judgment when deciding whether to classify
statements containing these signals as opinions. I omitted all
statements where, although a signal was used, no opinion was
expressed. For example, I included statements in which “consider”
was used synonymously with “believe” but omitted statements in
the following companies: 3M Co. (MMM), AT&T Inc. (T), AbbVie Inc. (ABBV), Abbott Laboratories
(ABT), Accenture plc A (ACN), Allergan plc (AGN), Allstate Corp. (ALL), Altria Group Inc. (MO),
Amazon.com Inc. (AMZN), American Express Co. (AXP), American International Group, Inc. (AIG),
Amgen Inc. (AMGN), Apple Inc. (AAPL), Bank of America Corp. (BAC), Berkshire Hathaway B
(BRK.B), Biogen Inc. (BIIB), BlackRock Inc. (BLK), Boeing Co. (BA), Bristol-Myers Squibb (BMY),
CVS Health Corporation (CVS), Capital One Financial (COF), Caterpillar Inc. (CAT), Celgene Corp.
(CELG), Chevron Corp. (CVX), Cisco Systems Inc. (CSCO), Citigroup Inc. (C), Coca-Cola Co. (KO),
Colgate-Palmolive Co. (CL), Comcast Corp. A (CMCSA), and ConocoPhillips (COP).
140. See Barbara A. Bliss, Frank Partnoy & Michael Furchtgott, Information Bundling and
Securities Litigation (June 2016), at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2795164
(“[L]arge firms, which are likely to have more sophisticated legal counsel, were more likely to use
positive bundling after the Dura ruling.”).
141. See SEC, Division of Corporation Finance, Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code
List, at https://www.sec.gov/info/edgar/siccodes.htm. The 20 SIC codes represented by this collection
of companies are as follows:
2080 – BEVERAGES; 2111 – CIGARETTES; 2834 PHARMACEUTICAL PREPARATIONS; 2836 - BIOLOGICAL PRODUCTS (NO DIAGNOSTIC
SUBSTANCES); 2844 - PERFUMES, COSMETICS & OTHER TOILET PREPARATIONS; 2911 PETROLEUM REFINING; 3531 - CONSTRUCTION MACHINERY & EQUIP; 3571 ELECTRONIC COMPUTERS; 3576 - COMPUTER COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT; 3721 –
AIRCRAFT; 3841 - SURGICAL & MEDICAL INSTRUMENTS & APPARATUS; 4813 TELEPHONE COMMUNICATIONS (NO RADIO TELEPHONE); 4841 - CABLE & OTHER PAY
TELEVISION SERVICES; 5912 - RETAIL-DRUG STORES AND PROPRIETARY STORES; 5961 RETAIL-CATALOG & MAIL-ORDER HOUSES; 6021 - NATIONAL COMMERCIAL BANKS;
6199 - FINANCE SERVICES; 6211 - SECURITY BROKERS, DEALERS & FLOTATION
COMPANIES; 6331 - FIRE, MARINE & CASUALTY INSURANCE; and 7389 - SERVICESBUSINESS SERVICES, NEC.
142. The five companies are: ABBV, ABT, AGN, BMY, and CELG.
143. I performed a search in the CCH SEC Staff Comment Letter Database, available on Westlaw,
on July 11, 2017.
144. See Omnicare, 135 S.Ct. at 1326 (“I believe” and “I think”) & 1334 (“in my estimation”).
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which “consider” was used synonymously with “deem,” “treat as,”
“think about,” or “take into account.”
Fourth, I included only those statements expressing opinions on
behalf of the issuer, a subsidiary of the issuer, the management, the
board, or a committee of the board. Therefore, I omitted the opinions
of auditors, attorneys, and other third parties.
Fifth, to the extent that the 10-K filings incorporated other SEC
filings by reference (such as annual reports to shareholders or proxy
statements), I searched the incorporated components of these filings
using the same methodology. When examining filings incorporated
by reference, I did not second-guess companies’ statements about
incorporation.145
Finally, some companies’ pre-Omnicare 10-Ks incorporated by
reference post-Omnicare proxy statements. I classified all such
incorporated statements as having been made post-Omnicare, even if
the proxy statement was filed the day after the Omnicare opinion was
issued.
C. Assessment of Omnicare’s Potential Impacts on Issuers’ Disclosure
Framework

In order to assess the potentially countervailing impacts of
Omnicare’s holdings on issuers’ disclosure decisions, I then engaged
in a qualitative analysis of the collection of pre- and post-Omnicare
opinions. With respect to Decision A, I looked at whether these
issuers post-Omnicare chose to: (1) remain silent on subjects about
which they had previously expressed opinions; (2) disclose opinions
on subjects about which they had previously remained silent; or (3)
neither. With respect to Decision B, I looked at whether these issuers
post-Omnicare chose to: (1) transform disclosures previously
expressed as statements of fact into opinions; (2) transform
disclosures previously expressed as opinions into statements of fact;
or (3) neither.
1. Collection of Points of Comparison

First, because some the pre-Omnicare 10-Ks incorporated postOmnicare statements by reference, I excluded all such statements,
and their later post-Omnicare comparators, from my analysis. This
reduced the set of examples to 1,967 statements of opinion. 1,004 of
145. Therefore, if companies failed to incorporate components that should have been
incorporated, I did not treat those components as incorporated. Likewise, if companies incorporated
components that were not required to be incorporated, I treated those components as incorporated.
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these statements of opinion were made pre-Omnicare, and 963 were
made post-Omnicare.
Second, I created a comparison chart, matching pre- and postOmnicare disclosures. This resulted in 847 sets of paired opinions,
157 pre-Omnicare opinions without a post-Omnicare corollary
opinion, and 116 post-Omnicare opinions without a pre-Omnicare
corollary opinion. The comparison chart therefore included 1,120
points of comparison. The following chart shows the results of this
comparison:
1,120 Points of
Comparison
847
150
107
7
9

1,004 Total Pre-Omnicare
963 Total Post-Omnicare
Opinions
Opinions
847 identical or substantially 847 identical or substantially
similar pre- and post-Omnicare similar pre- and post-Omnicare
150 omitted post-Omnicare
107 newly added post-Omnicare
7 opinions transformed into
statements of fact postOmnicare
9 statements of fact transformed
into opinions post-Omnicare
2. Qualitative Assessment of Points of Comparison

For the vast majority of the points of comparison—76 percent—
issuers did not adjust Decision A or Decision B post-Omnicare. Of
the 1,120 points of comparison, 847 sets of opinions were identical or
substantially similar pre- and post-Omnicare. This suggests that
Omnicare had very little impact, if any, on these issuers’ disclosure
decisions.
I then examined each disclosure decision in context to assess
whether there were any identifiable trends, however slight, pre- and
post-Omnicare.
With respect to Decision A, 150 opinions were omitted postOmnicare, and 107 opinions were newly added post-Omnicare. Of
course, there are many reasons why an opinion would be omitted or
added other than Omnicare’s impact. I examined each of these
disclosure decisions in context in an attempt to discard those that
were apparently attributable to reasons other than the impact of
Omnicare. Of the 150 opinions omitted post-Omnicare, I identified
117 that should be ignored because they resulted from changed
circumstances (such as the conclusion of litigation) or from
substantial revision of a disclosure section (such as the deletion of an
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entire paragraph, which just so happened to contain an opinion). Of
the 107 newly added post-Omnicare opinions, I identified 102 that
should be disregarded because they resulted from changed
circumstances (such as a new acquisition) or from substantial
revision of a disclosure section (such as the addition of an entire
paragraph, which just so happened to contain an opinion). Therefore,
with respect to Decision A, only 33 opinions were omitted without an
apparent non-Omnicare reason, and only five opinions were newly
added without such a reason. Therefore, if Omnicare had any impact
on Decision A, it may have slightly increased the pressure on these
companies to remain silent rather than to disclose statements of
opinion.
Here are several examples of opinions that companies elected to
omit post-Omnicare, without an apparent non-Omnicare reason:
• In Item 1 (Business) of its 2015 and 2016 10-Ks, Allergan
plc (AGN) discussed the divestiture of its western European
assets. The discussion was virtually identical in both 10-Ks,
except for the omission of the following sentence from the 2016
discussion: “We believe that the divestiture allowed the
Company to focus on faster growth markets including Central
and Eastern Europe, and other emerging markets which we
believe will enhance our long-term strategic objectives.”146
• In Item 7 (MD&A) of its 2015 and 2016 10-Ks, Altria
Group, Inc. (MO) discussed the operating results of its
smokeless products segment with virtually identical language,
except for the omission of the following sentence from the 2016
discussion: “USSTC continues to believe that the smokeless
category’s growth rate is best determined over a longer time
horizon and will continue to monitor industry volume
closely.”147
• In Item 1 (Business) of its 2015 and 2016 10-Ks, Caterpillar
Inc. (CAT) discussed its construction industries segment in
almost identical terms, except for the omission of the following
sentence from the 2016 discussion: “We believe that these
products have been well-received by our customers and are
providing us a competitive advantage.”148
146. Compare AGN 10-K SEC Filing p.6 (Feb. 28, 2015) (containing opinion), with AGN 10-K
SEC Filing p.9 (Feb. 26, 2016) (omitting opinion).
147. Compare MO 10-K SEC Filing p.15 (Feb. 25, 2015), with MO 10-K SEC Filing p.17 (Feb.
25, 2016) (omitting opinion).
148. Compare CAT 10-K SEC Filing p.1 (Feb. 17, 2015) (containing opinion), with CAT 10-K
SEC Filing p.1 (Feb. 16, 2016) (omitting opinion).
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• In Item 7 (MD&A) of its 2015 and 2016 10-Ks, Citigroup
Inc. (C) discussed the usage of a non-GAAP financial measure
to present the results of its Latin American operations. The
discussions were virtually identical, except for the omission of
the following sentence from the 2016 10-K: “Citi believes the
presentation of Latin America GCB’s results excluding the
impact of FX translation is a more meaningful depiction of the
underlying fundamentals of the business.”149
• In Item 1 (Business) of its 2015 10-K, Comcast Corporation
(CMCSA) disclosed: “In addition, while we believe that we are
in substantial compliance with FCC regulations, we are
occasionally subject to enforcement actions at the FCC, which
can result in our having to pay fines to the agency or being
subject to other sanctions.” In Item 1 of its 2016 10-K, Comcast
made an almost identical disclosure, except for the omission of
the clause containing an opinion about compliance: “We are
occasionally subject to enforcement actions at the FCC, which
can result in us having to pay fines to the agency or being
subject to other sanctions.”150
With respect to Decision B, seven pre-Omnicare opinions were
transformed into statements of fact post-Omnicare, and nine preOmnicare statements of fact were transformed into opinions postOmnicare. Again, there are many reasons why a statement of fact
would be transformed into an opinion (such as a newfound
uncertainty based on changed circumstances) or an opinion would be
transformed into a statement of fact (such as the solidification of a
previously uncertain position). I examined each of these disclosure
decisions in context in an attempt to discard those that were
apparently attributable to reasons other than the impact of Omnicare.
Of the seven pre-Omnicare opinions that were transformed into
statements of fact post-Omnicare, I identified two that should be
ignored because they resulted from changed circumstances (such as
new case law supporting a previously uncertain legal position).
Based on my contextual analysis, I did not identify any apparent nonOmnicare reason to explain the nine pre-Omnicare statements of fact
that were transformed into opinions post-Omnicare. Finally, of the
847 sets of opinions that I classified as virtually unchanged pre-and
post-Omnicare, I identified three sets where the opinion was softened
149. Compare C 10-K SEC Filing p.21 (Feb. 25, 2015) (containing opinion), with C 10-K SEC
Filing p.19 (Feb. 26, 2016) (omitting opinion).
150. Compare CMCSA 10-K SEC Filing p.29 (Feb. 27, 2015) (containing opinion), with CMCSA
10-K SEC Filing p.25 (Feb. 5, 2016) (omitting opinion).
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post-Omnicare without an apparent non-Omnicare reason, but I did
not identify any sets where the opinion was hardened post-Omnicare.
Therefore, if Omnicare had any impact on Decision B, it may have
slightly increased the incentive for these companies to soften
disclosures.
Here are several examples of pre-Omnicare statements of fact that
were transformed into statements of opinion post-Omnicare, without
an apparent non-Omnicare reason:
• In Item 1 (Business) of its 2015 and 2016 10-Ks, American
Express Company (AXP) discussed the expansion of its
corporate cards program. In 2015, American Express expressed
the growth opportunity associated with this expansion as a
statement of fact: “GCP is focused on continuing to expand its
business with mid-sized companies, which represent a
significant growth opportunity.” In 2016, American Express
softened this disclosure into an opinion: “We are focused on
continuing to expand our business with mid-sized companies
(defined in the United States as firms with annual revenues of
$10 million to $1 billion worldwide), which we believe
represents a significant growth opportunity.”151
• In Item 1 (Business) of its 2015 and 2016 10-Ks, Biogen
Inc. (BIIB) discussed its research and development strategy. In
2015, Biogen discussed its targets as a statement of fact: “By
applying our expertise in biologics and our growing capabilities
in small molecule, antisense, gene therapy, gene editing and
other technologies, we target specific medical needs where new
or better treatments are needed.” In 2016, Biogen softened this
disclosure into an opinion: “By applying our expertise in
biologics and our growing capabilities in small molecule,
antisense, gene therapy, gene editing and other technologies, we
target specific medical needs where we believe new or better
treatments are needed.”152
In addition, here are a few examples of pre-Omnicare opinions that
were further softened post-Omnicare, without an apparent nonOmnicare reason:
• In Item 1A (Risk Factors) of its pre- and post-Omnicare 10151. Compare AXP 10-K SEC Filing p.29 (Feb. 24, 2015) (expressing as a statement of fact),
with AXP 10-K SEC Filing p.11 (Feb. 19, 2016) (expressing as an opinion).
152. Compare BIIB 10-K SEC Filing p.4 (Feb. 4, 2015) (expressing as a statement of fact), with
BIIB 10-K SEC Filing p.14 (Feb. 3, 2016) (expressing as an opinion).
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Ks, Apple Inc. (AAPL) warned that its stock price is subject to
volatility. Pre-Omnicare, Apple stated that the “Company
believes its stock price reflects expectations of further growth
and profitability” and that the “Company also believes its stock
price reflects expectations that its cash dividends will continue
at current levels or grow and that its current share repurchase
program will be fully consummated.” Post-Omnicare, Apple
softened the contents of these opinions by adding the word
“should”, stating that the “Company believes its stock price
should reflect expectations of future growth and profitability”
and that the “Company also believes its stock price should
reflect expectations that its cash dividend will continue at
current levels or grow and that its current share repurchase
program will be fully consummated.”153
• In Item 1A (Risk Factors) of its 2015 and 2016 10-Ks,
American International Group, Inc. (AIG) warned that certain of
its products have guarantees that might increase the volatility of
its results. In 2015, AIG expressed the following belief about
the impact of its hedging program: “Finally, while we believe
the impact of downturns in equity markets, increased equity
volatility or reduced interest rates is offset by our economic
hedging program, the occurrence of one or more of these events
could result in an increase in the liabilities associated with the
guaranteed benefits, reducing our net income and shareholders’
equity.” In 2016, AIG softened this opinion by changing
“offset” to “mitigated” and by adding the warning that the offset
might not be complete: “Finally, while we believe the impact of
downturns in equity markets, increased equity volatility or
reduced interest rates would be mitigated by our economic
hedging program, the occurrence of one or more of these events
could result in an increase in the liabilities associated with the
guaranteed benefits that is not fully offset by the hedging
program, reducing our net income and shareholders’ equity.”154
3. Summation

In sum, this qualitative analysis suggests that Omnicare’s impact
on the pressures affecting these issuers’ disclosure decisions was
minimal. With respect to Decision A, Omnicare may have slightly
153. Compare AAPL 10-K SEC Filing p.18 (Oct. 27, 2014), with AAPL 10-K SEC Filing p.16
(Oct. 28, 2015).
154. Compare AIG 10-K SEC Filing p.36 (Feb. 25, 2015), with AIG 10-K SEC Filing p.38 (Feb.
19, 2016).
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increased the pressure on these issuers to remain silent rather than
disclose opinions. With respect to Decision B, it may have slightly
increased the incentive for these issuers to express disclosures as
opinions rather than as statements of fact. But these impacts, if any,
were modest.
This result is not surprising in light of the
countervailing nature of the impacts of Omnicare’s two holdings on
the risk of inaccurate or misleadingly incomplete disclosure and the
strength of the other pressures facing issuers (namely, market forces,
costs of disclosure, and risks of nondisclosure), which were not
affected by Omnicare.
In addition, some of the pre-Omnicare 10-Ks in the collection
might have been too late to reflect pre-Omnicare pressures, and some
of the post-Omnicare 10-Ks in the collection might have been too
early to reflect post-Omnicare pressures. To the extent that a
company anticipated Omnicare’s holdings or had its principal place
of business in a circuit whose controlling precedent was already
largely consistent with Omnicare,155 the company may have adjusted
its disclosure decisions prior to Omnicare. To the extent that a
company had not already adjusted its disclosure decisions prior to
Omnicare, it may not have made those adjustments in its 10-K
immediately following Omnicare’s issuance.
IV. APPLICATION OF ISSUERS’ DISCLOSURE FRAMEWORK TO ISSUERS’
POST-OMNICARE DISCLOSURES

Finally, regardless of any marginal impacts of Omnicare, I applied
the Issuers’ Disclosure Framework to issuers’ disclosure decisions in
a post-Omnicare world, with the goals of cataloging those areas in
which issuers are expressing disclosures as opinions; demonstrating
how the Issuers’ Disclosure Framework applies to specific types of
disclosure; identifying whether there are any areas in which issuers
are making non-optimal disclosure decisions; and proposing any
necessary adjustments to the pressures facing issuers to incentivize
optimal decision-making.
A. Collection of Issuers’ Post-Omnicare Opinion Disclosures

In order to assess the array of opinion disclosures post-Omnicare, I
compiled the issuer opinions contained in the 30 tracked companies’
155. James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas & Lynn Bai, Do Differences in Pleading Standards Cause
Forum Shopping in Securities Class Actions?: Doctrinal and Empirical Analyses, 2009 WIS. L. REV.
421, 451 (analyzing a sample of securities class action filings and finding that 85% were filed in the
circuit of the defendant firms’ principal place of business).
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post-Omnicare 10-Ks, for a total collection of 1,264 opinions.156 I
examined what types of disclosures these issuers expressed as
opinions, as opposed to remaining silent or disclosing as statements
of fact. The opinions at issue in Omnicare were risk factor
disclosures about legal compliance;157 and scholarly commentary
post-Omnicare, while acknowledging that issuers express opinions
about topics other than legal compliance, has focused on opinions
about legal compliance.158
This collection of post-Omnicare
opinions demonstrates that companies disclose opinions about
myriad topics beyond legal compliance, in multiple sections of their
10-Ks other than the risk factors section.
1. Overview of Opinions by Item

First, these companies expressed disclosures about opinions in 16
sections of their 10-Ks, not merely in their risk factor disclosures.
The distribution of opinions within these companies’ 10-Ks was as
follows, from greatest to least:
Item 7. Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial
Condition and Results of Operations (MD&A)159 (327 opinions)
Item 11. Executive Compensation160 (316 opinions)
Item 8. Financial Statements and Supplementary Data161 (238
opinions)
Item 1. Business162 (137 opinions)
Item 10. Directors and Executive Officers of the Registrant163
(99 opinions)
156. This number is larger than the 963 post-Omnicare opinions examined above in Part III.B.
The opinions analyzed in Part III.B excluded those 2016 post-Omnicare opinions whose previous
comparator also occurred post-Omnicare (as a consequence of incorporation by reference of a postOmnicare proxy statement).
157. Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. at 1323.
158. See Sale & Langevoort, supra note 60, at 765 (acknowledging that, although their article
focuses on compliance-related disclosures, “it applies to other disclosure issues as well”); Cox, supra
note 137, at 719 (recognizing that, although his article focuses on legal compliance disclosures,
Omnicare applies equally to MD&A opinions).
159. This item includes the mandatory disclosures defined in 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (Item 303 of
Reg. S-K).
160. This item includes the mandatory disclosures defined in 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.402, 229.407(e)(4)
& 229.407(e)(5) (Items 402, 407(e)(4) & 407(e)(5) of Reg. S-K).
161. This item includes the mandatory disclosures defined in 17 C.F.R. Part 210 (Reg. S-X).
162. This item includes the mandatory disclosures defined in 17 C.F.R. § 229.101 (Item 101 of
Reg. S-K).
163. This item includes the mandatory disclosures defined in 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.401, 229.405,
229.406, 229.407(c)(3), 229.407(d)(4) & 229.407(d)(5) (Items 401, 405, 406, 407(c)(3), 407 (d)(4) &
407 (d)(5) of Reg. S-K).
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Item 1A. Risk Factors164 (77 opinions)
Item 3. Legal Proceedings165 (19 opinions)
Item 2. Properties166 (18 opinions)
Item 7A. Quantitative and Qualitative Disclosures About
Market Risk167 (8 opinions)
Item 14. Principal Accountant Fees and Services168 (7 opinions)
Item 13. Certain Relationships and Related Transactions, and
Director Independence169 (6 opinions)
Item 12. Security Ownership of Certain Beneficial Owners and
Management and Related Stockholder Matters170 (5 opinions)
Item 9A. Controls and Procedures171 (4 opinions)
Item 6. Selected Financial Data172 (2 opinions)
Item 5. Market for Registrant’s Common Equity, Related
Stockholder Matters and Issuer Purchases of Equity Securities173
(1 opinion)
The first eight items in this list accounted for 97 percent of the
identified opinions.
Within Item 7 (MD&A), companies expressed opinions about
many topics, including the sufficiency of liquidity,174 the adequacy of
loss reserves,175 the appropriateness of reserve estimates,176 the
164. This item includes the mandatory disclosures defined in 17 C.F.R. § 229.503(c) (Item 503(c)
of Reg. S-K).
165. This item includes the mandatory disclosures defined in 17 C.F.R. § 229.103 (Item 103 of
Reg. S-K).
166. This item includes the mandatory disclosures defined in 17 C.F.R. § 229.102 (Item 102 of
Reg. S-K).
167. This item includes the mandatory disclosures defined in 17 C.F.R. § 229.305 (Item 305 of
Reg. S-K).
168. This item includes the mandatory disclosures defined § 9(e) of Schedule 14A.
169. This item includes the mandatory disclosures defined in 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.404 & 229.407(a)
(Items 404 & 407(a) of Reg. S-K).
170. This item includes the mandatory disclosures defined in 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.201(d) & 229.403
(Items 201(d) & 403 of Reg. S-K).
171. This item includes the mandatory disclosures defined in 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.307 & 229.308
(Items 307 & 308 of Reg. S-K).
172. This item includes the mandatory disclosures defined in 17 C.F.R. § 229.301 (Item 301 of
Reg. S-K).
173. This item includes the mandatory disclosures defined in 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.201, 229.701 &
229.703 (Items 201, 701 & 703 of Reg. S-K).
174. E.g., ALL 10-K SEC Filing p.91 (Feb. 19, 2016) (“We believe we have sufficient liquidity to
meet these needs.”).
175. E.g., CVS 10-K SEC Filing p.20 (Feb. 9, 2016) (“Given our experience, we believe that our
aggregate reserves for potential losses are adequate, but if . . .”).
176. E.g., ALL 10-K SEC Filing p.50 (Feb. 19, 2016) (“Because of our annual review, we believe
that our reserves are appropriately established based on available information, technology, laws and
regulations.”).
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reasonableness of estimates and assumptions,177 the helpfulness of
non-GAAP measures to investors,178 the business environment,179
and the business model.180
Within Item 11 (Executive Compensation), the vast majority of
opinions (278 out of 316) were contained in the Compensation
Discussion and Analysis (“CD&A”) section. Within CD&A,
companies expressed opinions about various subjects, including
compensation philosophy,181 the alignment of compensation with
performance,182 the appropriateness of performance metrics,183 the
appropriate balance of awards,184 the appropriateness of the firms
selected for peer benchmarking,185 the rationale for not limiting
compensation to that which is tax deductible,186 the appropriateness
177. E.g., MMM 10-K SEC Filing p.34 (Feb. 11, 2016) (“Management bases its estimates on
historical experience and on various assumptions that are believed to be reasonable under the
circumstances . . .”).
178. E.g., BA 10-K SEC Filing p.43 (Feb. 10, 2016) (“Management believes these core earnings
measures provide investors additional insights into operational performance as unallocated pension and
other postretirement benefit costs primarily represent costs driven by market factors and costs not
allocable to U.S. government contracts.”).
179. E.g., MO 10-K SEC Filing p.23 (Feb. 25, 2016) (“Our tobacco subsidiaries believe that a
significant number of adult tobacco consumers switch between tobacco categories, use multiple forms of
tobacco products and try innovative tobacco products, such as e-vapor products.”).
180. E.g., CELG 10-K SEC Filing p.47 (Feb. 11, 2016) (“Our products are used to treat lifethreatening diseases and we believe this business model enables timely delivery and adequate supply of
products.”).
181. E.g., BMY 10-K SEC Filing (Feb. 12, 2016) (incorporated by reference from March 23,
2016 proxy statement p.43) (“We believe that an executive’s compensation should be directly tied to
helping us achieve our mission and deliver value to our stockholders.”).
182. E.g., BLK 10-K SEC Filing (Feb. 26, 2016) (incorporated by reference from Apr. 15, 2016
proxy statement p.37) (“BlackRock believes in aligning the interests of our senior-level employees,
including NEOs, with those of stockholders, and in closely aligning compensation with long-term
performance.”).
183. E.g., MO 10-K SEC Filing (Feb. 25, 2016) (incorporated by reference from Apr. 7, 2016
proxy statement p.38) (“The Compensation Committee uses adjusted diluted EPS growth and adjusted
discretionary cash flow as the key financial measures in determining annual incentive awards . . . . The
Compensation Committee believes that the combination of these metrics provides the best alignment
between our Company’s business strategy and our shareholders’ interests . . . .”).
184. E.g., CVX 10-K SEC Filing (Feb. 25, 2016) (incorporated by reference from Apr. 7, 2016
proxy statement p.42) (“[L]ong-term incentive awards are typically awarded as 60 percent stock options
and 40 percent performance shares. This combination provides a balance of awards, which the MCC
believes appropriately serves both performance incentive and executive retention objectives.”).
185. E.g., CAT 10-K SEC Filing (Feb. 16, 2016) (incorporated by reference from Apr. 25, 2016
proxy statement p.35) (“The Committee formed the 2016 Direct Competitor Peer Group by selecting
seven of the Company’s competitors that, in the opinion of the Committee, compete in the same markets
as the Company, or offer similar products and services as the Company, or serve the same, or similar,
industries or end-users as the Company.”).
186. E.g., BA 10-K SEC Filing (Feb. 10, 2016) (incorporated by reference from March 18, 2016
proxy statement p.35) (“We also believe that it is important to preserve flexibility in administering
compensation programs in a manner designed to promote varying corporate goals. Accordingly, we
have not adopted a policy that all compensation must qualify as deductible under Section 162(m).”).
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of providing perquisites,187 the assessment of compensation risk,188
and the company’s interpretation of say-on-pay votes.189
Within Item 8 (Financial Statements and Supplementary Data),
almost all of the opinions (234 out of 238) were contained in the
notes to financial statements. Within these notes, companies
expressed opinions about various topics, including the adequacy of
provisions for outstanding tax issues,190 exposure to credit risk,191 the
measurement of fair value,192 contingent liability,193 realization of
deferred tax assets,194 accounting for inventory,195 impairment of
investments,196 and the impact of changes in accounting standards.197
187. E.g., AGN 10-K SEC Filing (Feb. 26, 2016) (incorporated by reference from March 25, 2016
proxy statement p.24) (“We believe that each of these perquisites has an important business purpose.”).
188. E.g., AAPL 10-K SEC Filing (Oct. 28, 2015) (incorporated by reference from Jan. 6, 2016
proxy statement p.20-21) (“The Compensation Committee believes that these awards do not encourage
unnecessary or excessive risk-taking because the ultimate value of the awards is tied to Apple’s stock
price performance over several years and because awards are subject to regular vesting schedules to help
ensure that a significant component of executive compensation is tied to long-term shareholder value
creation.”).
189. E.g., ACN 10-K SEC Filing (Oct. 30, 2015) (incorporated by reference from Dec. 11, 2015
proxy statement p.35) (“Given this strong support, which we believe demonstrates our shareholders’
satisfaction with the alignment of our names executive officers’ compensation with the Company’s
performance, the Compensation Committee determined not to implement any significant changes to our
compensation programs in fiscal 2015 as a result of the shareholder advisory vote.”).
190. E.g., BA 10-K SEC Filing p.69 (Feb. 10, 2016) (“We believe appropriate provisions for all
outstanding tax issues have been made for all jurisdictions and all open years.”).
191. E.g., KO 10-K SEC Filing p.84 (Feb. 25, 2016) (“We believe our exposure to concentrations
of credit risk is limited due to the diverse geographic areas covered by our operations.”).
192. E.g., COF 10-K SEC Filing p.207 (Feb. 25, 2016) (“The model [to determine the fair value
of mortgage servicing rights] incorporates assumptions that we believe other market participants use in
estimating future net servicing income, including estimates of prepayment speeds, discount rate/optionadjusted spreads, cost to service, contractual servicing fee income, ancillary income and late fees.”).
193. E.g., BAC 10-K SEC Filing p.200 (Feb. 24, 2016) (“Based on current knowledge,
management does not believe that loss contingencies arising from pending matters, including the matters
described herein, will have a material adverse effect on the consolidated financial position or liquidity of
the Corporation.”).
194. E.g., C 10-K SEC Filing p.122 (Feb. 26, 2016) (“Citi believes that the realization of the
recognized net DTAs of $47.8 billion at December 31, 2015 is more-likely-than-not based upon
expectations as to future taxable income in jurisdictions in which the DTAs arise and available tax
planning strategies . . . that would be implemented, if necessary, to prevent a carry-forward from
expiring.”).
195. E.g., CVS 10-K SEC Filing p.21 (Feb. 9, 2016) (“The Company believes the weighted
average cost method is preferable to the retail inventory method and the FIFO cost method because it
results in greater precision in the determination of cost of revenues and inventories at the stock keeping
unit (“SKU”) level and results in a consistent inventory valuation method for all of the Company’s
inventories . . . .”).
196. E.g., AAPL 10-K SEC Filing p.50 (Oct. 28, 2015) (“As of September 26, 2015, the
Company considers the declines in market value of its marketable securities investment portfolio to be
temporary in nature and does not consider any of its investments other-than-temporarily impaired.”).
197. E.g., T 10-K SEC Filing p.47 (Feb. 18, 2016) (“Upon initial evaluation, we believe the key
changes in the standard that impact our revenue recognition relate to the allocation of contract revenues
between various services and equipment, and the timing in which those revenues are recognized.”).
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Within Item 1 (Business), companies expressed opinions about
various subjects, including business strategy,198 competitive
advantage,199 competition,200 brand,201 customers,202 research and
development,203 employee relations,204 adequacy of raw material
supply,205 and importance of intellectual property.206
Within Item 10 (Directors and Executive Officers of the
Registrant), companies generally expressed opinions about two
topics: compliance with the beneficial ownership reporting
requirements under § 16(a) of the Exchange Act207 and qualifications
of directors.208
Within Item 1A (Risk Factors), companies expressed opinions
about various company-specific and general risks. These opinions
were usually cautiously positive perspectives about the mitigation of
risk. For example, companies expressed opinions that ongoing
litigation against the company was not meritorious,209 that its tax
198. E.g., AAPL 10-K SEC Filing p.1 (Oct. 28, 2015) (“The Company believes a high-quality
buying experience with knowledgeable salespersons who can convey the value of the Company’s
products and services greatly enhances its ability to attract and retain customers.”).
199. E.g., CAT 10-K SEC Filing p.2 (Feb. 16, 2016) (“We believe that our emissions technology
provides a competitive advantage in connection with emissions standards compliance and
performance.”).
200. E.g., BMY 10-K SEC Filing p.16 (Feb. 12, 2016) (“We believe our long-term competitive
position depends upon our success in discovering and developing innovative, cost-effective products
that serve unmet medical needs, together with our ability to manufacture products efficiently and to
market them effectively in a highly competitive environment.”).
201. E.g., AXP 10-K SEC Filing p.3 (Feb. 19, 2016) (“We believe our brand and its attributes are
critical to our success, and we invest heavily in managing, marketing, promotion and protecting it.”).
202. E.g., CVS 10-K SEC Filing p.7 (Feb. 9, 2016) (“We believe that continuing to be the first to
market with new and unique products and services, using innovative marketing and adjusting our mix of
merchandise to match our customers’ needs and preferences is very important to our ability to continue
to improve customer satisfaction.”).
203. E.g., BMY 10-K SEC Filing p.6 (Feb. 12, 2016) (“We invest heavily in research and
development (R&D) because we believe it is critical to our long-term competitiveness.”).
204. E.g., KO 10-K SEC Filing p.10 (Feb. 25, 2016) (“The Company believes that its relations
with its employees are generally satisfactory.”).
205. E.g., BRKB 10-K SEC Filing p.17 (Feb. 29, 2016) (“Management currently believes there
are readily available alternative sources of raw materials and yarn.”).
206. E.g., CL 10-K SEC Filing p.2 (Feb. 18, 2016) (“Trademarks are considered to be of material
importance to the Company’s business.”).
207. E.g., CL 10-K SEC Filing (Feb. 18, 2016) (incorporated by reference from March 23, 2016
proxy statement p.59) (“Based on the Company’s review of copies of these reports and officer and
director certifications, the Company believes that all Section 16(a) filing requirements applicable to its
directors and executive officers were complied with during 2015.”).
208. E.g., CMCSA 10-K SEC Filing (Feb. 5, 2016) (incorporated by reference from Apr. 8, 2016
proxy statement p.18) (“We believe that Mr. Bacon’s significant experience in government affairs, the
financial and housing industries and the non-profit, educational and philanthropic communities render
him qualified to serve as one of our directors.”).
209. E.g., CSCO 10-K SEC Filing p.32 (Sept. 8, 2015) (“While we believe there is no legal basis
for the alleged liability, due to the complexities and uncertainty surrounding the judicial process in
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positions were reasonable,210 that the company was compliant with
applicable regulations,211 that the company was well-positioned to
face competition,212 that the company was protected against cyberattack,213 that the company’s assumptions and estimates were
reasonable,214 and that the company had adopted appropriate risk
management and compliance programs.215
Within Item 3 (Legal Proceedings), companies usually expressed
favorable opinions about the risk associated with legal proceedings,
such as that claims asserted against the company were without
merit,216 that the company’s litigation defenses were meritorious,217
and that pending litigation would not have a material adverse effect
on the company’s financial position, cash flows, or results of
operations.218
Within Item 2 (Properties), companies usually expressed
generalized, positive opinions about the company’s properties, such
as that the company’s facilities were suitable for the company’s
uses,219 that the company’s facilities were adequate to meet the
Brazil and the nature of the claims asserting joint liability with the importer, we are unable to determine
the likelihood of an unfavorable outcome against our Brazilian subsidiary and are unable to reasonably
estimate a range of loss, if any.”).
210. E.g., AXP 10-K SEC Filing p.43 (Feb. 19, 2016) (“Although management believes our tax
positions are reasonable, we are subject to audit by the Internal Revenue Service and by tax authorities
in all jurisdictions in which we conduct business operations.”).
211. E.g., BIIB 10-K SEC Filing p.43 (Feb. 3, 2016) (“Although we believe that our safety
procedures for handling and disposing of such materials comply with state, federal and foreign
standards, there will always be the risk of accidental contamination or injury.”).
212. E.g., AAPL 10-K SEC Filing p.8 (Oct. 28, 2015) (“The Company believes it is unique in that
it designs and develops nearly the entire solution for its products, including the hardware, operating
system, numerous software applications and related services.”).
213. E.g., COF 10-K SEC Filing p.21 (Feb. 25, 2016) (“Although we believe we have a robust
suite of authentication and layered security controls, including our cyber threat analytics, data
encryption and tokenization technologies, anti-malware defenses and vulnerability management
program, any one or combination of these controls could fail to detect, mitigate or remediate these risks
in a timely manner.”).
214. E.g., ACN 10-K SEC Filing p.19 (Oct. 30, 2015) (“We base our estimates on historical
experience, contractual commitments and on various other assumptions that we believe to be reasonable
under the circumstances and at the time they are made.”).
215. E.g., BAC 10-K SEC Filing p.13 (Feb. 24, 2016) (“While we believe that we have adopted
appropriate risk management and compliance programs, compliance risks will continue to exist,
particularly as we adapt to new rules and regulations.”).
216. E.g., BLK 10-K SEC Filing p.27 (Feb. 26, 2016) (“BlackRock believes the claims in the
lawsuits are without merit and intends to vigorously defend the actions.”).
217. E.g., AXP 10-K SEC Filing p.46 (Feb. 19, 2016) (“We believe we have meritorious defenses
to each of these legal proceedings and intend to defend them vigorously.”).
218. E.g., ABT 10-K SEC Filing p.75 (Feb. 19, 2016) (“While it is not feasible to predict the
outcome of such pending claims, proceedings and investigations with certainty, management is of the
opinion that their ultimate resolution should not have a material adverse effect on Abbott’s financial
position, cash flows, or results of operations.”).
219. E.g., MO 10-K SEC Filing p.10 (Feb. 25, 2016) (“The plants and properties owned or leased
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company’s needs,220 and that existing leases could be renewed or
replaced.221
2. Overview of Opinions by Topic

Issuers also expressed opinions about the same subjects across
items. For example, as then-SEC Chair Mary Jo White noted in a
speech about potential disclosure reform, legal proceeding
disclosures are often repeated “in the risk factors, in the MD&A and
in the notes to the financial statements.”222 In order to capture some
of these cross-item discussions, I tracked companies’ disclosure of
opinions about several topics across items.
First, with respect to legal compliance and legal risk, the
companies in my collection expressed 86 opinions about legal
compliance (including compliance with tax laws and compliance
with § 16(a) reporting requirements). These opinions were contained
in Item I (Business),223 Item 1A (Risk Factors),224 Item 3 (Legal
Proceedings),225 Item 7 (MD&A),226 Item 8 (Financial Statements
and Supplementary Data),227 and Item 10 (Directors and Executive
Officers of the Registrant).228 Relatedly, companies expressed 170
opinions about legal risk associated with non-compliance, including
and operated by Altria Group, Inc. and its subsidiaries are maintained in good condition and are believed
to be suitable and adequate for present needs.”).
220. E.g., ACN 10-K SEC Filing p.21 (Oct. 30, 2015) (“We believe that our facilities are
adequate to meet our needs in the near future.”).
221. E.g., CVS 10-K SEC Filing p.22 (Feb. 9, 2016) (“At the end of the existing lease terms,
management believes the leases can be renewed or replaced by alternative space.”).
222. Accord SEC Chair Mary Jo White, Speech, The Path Forward on Disclosure (Oct. 15, 2013),
at https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch101513mjw.
223. E.g., ABBV 10-K SEC Filing p.7 (Feb. 19, 2016) (“AbbVie believes that its operations
comply in all material respects with applicable laws and regulations concerning environmental
protection.”).
224. E.g., AMZN 10-K SEC Filing p.8 (Jan. 29, 2016) (“Although we believe these structures and
activities comply with existing laws, they involve unique risks, and the PRC is actively considering
changes in its foreign investment rules that could impact these structures and activities.”).
225. E.g., KO 10-K SEC Filing p.24 (Feb. 25, 2016) (“The Company firmly believes that the IRS’
claims are without merit and plans to pursue all available administrative and judicial remedies necessary
to resolve the matter.”).
226. E.g., ACN 10-K SEC Filing p.32 (Oct. 30, 2015) (“We believe our tax positions comply with
applicable tax law and that we have adequately accounted for uncertain tax positions.”).
227. E.g., CVS 10-K SEC Filing p.64 (Feb. 9, 2016) (“Omnicare cooperated with this
investigation and believes that it has complied with applicable laws and regulations with respect to this
matter.”).
228. E.g., CAT 10-K SEC Filing (Feb. 16, 2016) (incorporated by reference from Apr. 25, 2016
proxy statement p.56) (“Based on a review of our records, we believes that all reports required to be
filed during 2015 pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 were filed on a
timely basis.”).
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ongoing litigation and tax positions. These opinions were contained
in Item I (Business),229 Item 1A (Risk Factors),230 Item 3 (Legal
Proceedings),231 Item 7 (MD&A),232 and Item 8 (Financial
Statements and Supplementary Data).233 Many of the opinions
discussed both legal compliance and legal risk, such as expressing
the view that ongoing litigation against the company was without
merit because the company was legally compliant.234
Second, consistent with the role of materiality as a mandatory
disclosure trigger,235 112 of the opinions in the collection expressed
views about the materiality, or lack thereof, of various pieces of
information. For example, companies expressed opinions about
whether they were in material compliance with environmental
regulations,236 whether their intellectual property was of material
importance to the company’s business,237 and whether revised figures
were material to previously issued financial statements.238 They also
229. E.g., T 10-K SEC Filing p.10 (Feb. 18, 2016) (“While the outcome of any litigation is
uncertain, we do not believe that the resolution of any of these infringement claims or the expiration or
non-renewal of any of our intellectual property rights would have a material adverse effect on our results
of operations.”).
230. E.g., MO 10-K SEC Filing p.5 (Feb. 25, 2016) (“Altria Group, Inc. and each of its
subsidiaries named as a defendant believe, and each has been so advised by counsel handling the
respective cases, that it has valid defenses to the litigation pending against it, as well as valid bases for
appeal of adverse verdicts.”).
231. E.g., CL 10-K SEC Filing p.15 (Feb. 18, 2016) (“The Company and its legal counsel believe
these damages allegations are without merit and are vigorously challenging them and defending this
case on its merits.”).
232. E.g., AAPL 10-K SEC Filing p.57 (Oct. 28, 2015) (“The Company believes the European
Commission’s assertions are without merit.”).
233. E.g., CVS 10-K SEC Filing p.63 (Feb. 9, 2016) (“The Company believes that the allegations
are without merit.”).
234. E.g., CSCO 10-K SEC Filing p.30 (Sept. 8, 2015) (“We have completed a thorough review
of the matters and believe the asserted claims . . . are without merit, and we are defending the claims
vigorously.”).
235. Mary Jo White, Chair, SEC, The Path Forward on Disclosure (Oct. 15, 2013), (“After nearly
a century in the making, our disclosure regime is not based entirely on line item requirements; rather, it
is fundamentally grounded on the standard of ‘materiality.’”); Yvonne Ching Ling Lee, The Elusive
Concept of “Materiality” Under U.S. Federal Securities Laws, 40 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 661, 670-71
(2004) (“Regulation S-K, which relates to the financial condition and results of operations pursuant to
informational disclosure requirements of the Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of
1934, contains numerous provisions that touch upon ‘materiality.”’).
236. E.g., AGN 10-K SEC Filing p.21 (Feb. 26, 2016) (“We believe that our operations comply in
all material respects with applicable environmental laws and regulations in each jurisdiction where we
have a business presence, and we periodically audit our manufacturing and R&D facilities for
compliance with all federal, state and local environmental laws and regulations.”).
237. E.g., ABT 10-K SEC Filing p.5 (Feb. 19, 2016) (“These, and various other patents which
expire during the period 2016 to 2036, in the aggregate, are believed to be of material importance to the
operation of Abbott’s business.”).
238. E.g., AIG 10-K SEC Filing p.120 (Feb. 19, 2016) (“The Utilities and Energy amounts at
December 31, 2014, have been revised from $23.7 billion and $12.0 billion to $19.2 billion and $16.5
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expressed opinions about whether various risks (such as legal
proceedings,239 tax audits,240 changes in accounting rules,241 credit
downgrades,242 and compensation policies243) were likely to have a
material adverse effect on the company. Interestingly, although 95
percent of the opinions in the collection (1,195 out of 1,264) were
expressed in positive terms (“we believe that . . .”), 35 percent of the
materiality-related opinions (39 out of 112) were expressed in
negative terms (“we do not believe that . . .”).
Third, companies differed in their expression of management’s
annual report on the effectiveness of internal controls over financial
reporting.244 Most of the companies in the collection expressed these
reports as statements of fact, using the words “concluded”245 or
“determined.”246 For example, Apple Inc. expressed this disclosure
as follows: “Based on the Company’s assessment, management has
concluded that its internal control over financial reporting was
effective as of September 26, 2015 to provide reasonable assurance
regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of
financial statements in accordance with GAAP.”247 However, 6 of
billion, respectively, to conform to current industry classification, which are not considered material to
previously issued financial statements.”).
239. E.g., BA 10-K SEC Filing p.105 (Feb. 10, 2016) (“We believe, based upon current
information, that the outcome of any such government disputes and investigations will not have a
material effect on our financial position, results of operations, or cash flows.”).
240. E.g., ACN 10-K SEC Filing F-23 (Oct. 30, 2015) (“Although the outcome of tax audits is
always uncertain and could result in significant cash tax payments, the Company does not believe the
outcome of these audits will have a material adverse effect on the Company’s consolidated financial
position or results of operations.”).
241. E.g., BIIB 10-K SEC Filing F-20 (Feb. 3, 2016) (“Unless otherwise discussed, we do not
believe that the impact of recently issued standards that are not yet effective will have a material impact
on our financial position or results of operations upon adoption.”).
242. E.g., KO 10-K SEC Filing p.65 (Feb. 25, 2016) (“The Company does not believe that this
downgrade will have a material adverse effect on our cost of borrowing.”).
243. E.g., CSCO 10-K SEC Filing (Sept. 8, 2015) (incorporated by reference from Sept. 30, 2015
proxy statement p.46) (“In this regard, the Compensation Committee reviews Cisco’s compensation
programs for employees and executives, including the annual cash incentive plans and long-term,
equity-based incentive awards, and does not believe that the compensation program creates risks that are
reasonably likely to have a material adverse effect on Cisco.”).
244. 17 C.F.R. § 229.308(a)(3) (2017) (requiring issuers to annually disclose “[m]anagement's
assessment of the effectiveness of the registrant's internal control over financial reporting as of the end
of the registrant's most recent fiscal year, including a statement as to whether or not internal control over
financial reporting is effective”).
245. E.g., CMCSA 10-K SEC Filing p.74 (Feb. 5, 2016) (“Based on this evaluation, our
management concluded that Comcast’s system of internal control over financial reporting was effective
as of December 31, 2015.”).
246. E.g., KO 10-K SEC Filing p.109 (Feb. 25, 2016) (“Based on this assessment, management
determined that, as of December 31, 2015, Altria Group, Inc. maintained effective internal control over
financial reporting.”).
247. AAPL 10-K SEC Filing p.71 (Oct. 28, 2015).
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the 30 companies softened these reports, expressing them as
opinions.248 For example, Abbott Laboratories expressed this
disclosure as follows: “Based on our assessment, we believe that, as
of December 31, 2015, the company’s internal control over financial
reporting was effective based on those criteria.”249
B. Analysis of Issuers’ Post-Omnicare Disclosure Decisions

Finally, I applied the Issuers’ Disclosure Framework250 to some of
the key categories of opinions revealed in the above collection of
post-Omnicare opinions. In particular, I applied the framework to
the following categories of disclosure: (1) legal compliance and legal
proceeding disclosures; (2) § 16(a) compliance disclosures; (3)
discussion and analysis disclosures (contained in MD&A or CD&A);
(4) disclosures about the suitability or adequacy of physical
properties; and (5) disclosures about the effectiveness of internal
controls over financial reporting.
This analysis serves two purposes. First, it shows how the Issuers’
Disclosure Framework applies to specific types of disclosure,
demonstrating the role that the framework should play in ongoing
policy discussions about revising disclosure mandates. Second, it
yields normative conclusions about whether the issuers in my
collection are currently making optimal disclosure decisions,
especially with respect to Decision B. Based on this analysis, I
conclude that, although most of these issuers’ disclosure decisions
are optimal, several adjustments to the pressures affecting issuer
decision-making are warranted.
1. Legal Compliance and Legal Proceeding Disclosures

Issuers frequently disclose opinions about whether they are legally
compliant and about whether legal proceedings asserted against the
company are meritorious.251 With the exception of disclosures about
§ 16(a) compliance, which are discussed below,252 these disclosures
are technically voluntary, although they are intrinsically related to
various mandatory disclosures. The issue of legal compliance is
248. See ABT 10-K SEC Filing (Feb. 19, 2016); AMGN 10-K SEC Filing (Feb. 16, 2016); T 10K SEC Filing (Feb. 18, 2016); CC 10-K SEC Filing (Feb. 26, 2016); KO 10-K SEC Filing (Feb. 25,
2016); COP 10-K SEC Filing (Feb. 23, 2016).
249. ABT 10-K SEC Filing p.89 (Feb. 19, 2016).
250. See supra Parts I & II.
251. See, supra, text accompanying notes 223-34.
252. See infra Part IV.B.2.
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interconnected with several disclosure requirements, including the
material costs and effects of compliance with environmental laws;253
the most significant risk factors that may affect the securities;254 the
material pending legal proceedings involving the company;255 and
management’s discussion of the company’s financial condition,
changes in financial condition, and results of operations.256 For
example, Omnicare’s disclosure of legal compliance was included in
its risk factor disclosures.257 Similarly, the merits, or lack thereof, of
the material legal proceedings asserted against a company are
interconnected with the company’s mandatory disclosure of the
proceedings themselves258 and with the company’s financial
statements, which must account for loss contingencies.259
Under Decision A, disclosure, rather than silence, about the
company’s legal compliance and the merits of material legal
proceedings is optimal because the marginal benefits of these
disclosures exceed their marginal costs.260 On the benefits side, this
information is critically important to investors in light of the potential
impacts of liability for non-compliance, up to and including
bankruptcy.261 Indeed, the fact that companies routinely disclose this
information voluntarily suggests that they recognize how important it
is to investors. On the costs side, in light of the importance of
compliance and potential liability to the company’s business,
management should already be monitoring these issues closely, and
thus disclosing this already-compiled information should not impose
significant costs.
Under Decision B, most disclosures about legal compliance and
about the merits of legal proceedings are optimally expressed as
253. 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(c)(1)(xii) (2011)
254. 17 C.F.R. § 229.503(c) (2011).
255. 17 C.F.R. § 229.103 (2011).
256. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a) (2017).
257. Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Constr. Indus. Pension Fund, 135 S. Ct. 1318, 1327
& 1332 (2015).
258. 17 C.F.R. § 229.103.
259. See Sample Letter From SEC Division of Corporate Finance Sent to Public Companies on
Accounting and Disclosure Issues Related to Potential Risks and Costs Associated with Mortgage and
Foreclosure-Related Activities or Exposures (Oct. 2010), (“ASC Subtopic 450-20 (SFAS 5) requires
you to establish accruals for litigation and other contingencies when it is probable that a loss has been
incurred and the amount of the loss can be reasonably estimated. When a loss is not both probable and
estimable, an accrual is not recorded, but disclosure of the contingency is required to be made when
there is at least a reasonable possibility that a loss or an additional loss has been incurred. The disclosure
should indicate the nature of the contingency and give an estimate of the possible loss or range of loss or
state that such an estimate cannot be made.”).
260. See supra Part I.B.1.
261. E.g., Peg Brickley, Kaiser Gypsum Turns to Bankruptcy for Asbestos Answer, Wall St. J. ,
Oct. 3, 2016.).
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opinions. Because these disclosures are usually about inherently
uncertain topics, their informational value is enhanced by their
expression as opinions.262
With respect to legal compliance, to the extent that regulatory
requirements are vague or ambiguous,263 it is inherently uncertain
whether a company is actually compliant. Indeed, most regulatory
requirements fall into this category.264 Therefore, to the extent that
companies are discussing their compliance with regulatory
requirements that are not crystalline, it is optimal to express those
statements as opinions. For instance, in light of the inherent
uncertainty of compliance with the vast array of applicable
environmental regulations, Allergan plc appropriately expressed the
following compliance disclosure as an opinion: “We believe that our
operations comply in all material respects with applicable
environmental laws and regulations in each jurisdiction where we
have a business presence, and we periodically audit our
manufacturing and R&D facilities for compliance with all federal,
state and local environmental laws and regulations.”265
With respect to the merits of legal proceedings, litigation is
inherently uncertain in light of the various factors that can affect the
outcome of litigation, including the judge’s interpretation of the law,
the prowess of each party’s counsel, and the decision-making of the
factfinder. Indeed, it would likely violate the rules of professional
conduct for an attorney to guarantee a particular outcome in
litigation.266 Therefore, most statements about the merits of pending
litigation are appropriately expressed as opinions. For instance,
because of the inherent uncertainty of litigation, BlackRock, Inc.
appropriately expressed the following disclosure as an opinion:
“BlackRock believes the claims in the lawsuits are without merit and

262. See, supra, Part I.B.2.
263. As an example of a vague or ambiguous regulation, consider the Supreme Court’s recent
analysis of whether pharmaceutical representatives are “outside salesman,” so as to be outside the reach
of the Fair Labor Standards Act’s maximum hour and minimum wage requirements. Christopher v.
SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142 (2012).
264. John E. Calfee Richard, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal Standards,
70 VA. L. REV. 965, 965 (1984) (“When analyzing legal standards, it is convenient to assume that the
parties subject to a standard know exactly what behavior is required of them. In practice, however, such
certainty is rarely present.”).
265. AGN 10-K SEC Filing (Feb. 26, 2016).
266. See ABA Model Rule of Prof’l Conduct r. 7.1 (Am. Bar Ass’n 2009)(“A lawyer shall not
make a false or misleading communication about the lawyer or the lawyer's services.”); Fla. Rule of
Prof’l Conduct r. 4-7.13(b) (Fla. Bar Ass’n 2013) (“Deceptive or inherently misleading advertisements
include, but are not limited to advertisements that contain . . . statements or information that can
reasonably be interpreted by a prospective client as a prediction or guaranty of success or specific results
. . .”).

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018

53

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 4

640

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 86

intends to vigorously defend the actions.”267
Therefore, because issuers are making optimal decisions with
respect to compliance disclosures about vague or ambiguous
regulations and with respect to legal proceeding disclosures, no
adjustments to the pressures facing issuers are necessary.268
2. Section 16(a) Compliance Disclosures

Issuers also frequently express their § 16(a) compliance
disclosures as opinions.269 Although these qualify as disclosures
about legal compliance, which are discussed above,270 I analyzed §
16(a) compliance disclosures separately because the Issuers’
Disclosure Framework applies to them differently.
Section 16(a) of the Exchange Act271 and the rules promulgated272
thereunder require directors, officers, and principal shareholders to
file initial statements of beneficial ownership within 10 days of
becoming an insider (on Form 3); statements reflecting most changes
in beneficial ownership within two business days of the transaction
(on Form 4); and statements identifying transactions that should have
been reported earlier on Form 4 (on Form 5).273 These insider
disclosures serve as a “weapon against the abuse of insider
information,”274 allow investors “to consider the extent of insiders’
economic stake in the success of the company,”275 and may “provide
useful information as to insiders’ views of the performance or
prospects of the company.”276
Issuers themselves are required, within Item 10 of their Form 10Ks, to “identify each person who . . . failed to file on a timely basis,
as disclosed in the above Forms, reports required by section 16(a) of
the Exchange Act during the most recent fiscal year or prior fiscal
years.”277
These mandatory disclosures serve to incentivize

267. BLK 10-K SEC Filing p.27 (Feb. 26, 2016).
268. See supra Part II.C.
269. See supra text accompanying note 207.
270. See supra Part IV.B.1.
271. 15 U.S.C. § 78p (2011).
272. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.16a-1 to 240.16a-13 (2011).
273. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-3; SEC, Initial Statement of Beneficial Ownership of Sec (Form 3);
SEC, Statement of Changes in Beneficial Ownership (Form 4); SEC, Annual Statement of Changes in
Beneficial Ownership of Sec (Form 5).
274. H.R. Rep. No. 73-1383, at 13 (1934).
275. SEC Investor Bulletin, Insider Transactions and Forms 3, 4, and 5, SEC Pub. No. 137 2
(2003).
276. Id.
277. 17 C.F.R. § 405(a)(1) (Item 405(a)(1) of Reg. S-K) (2011).
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compliance by insiders278 and to flag delinquent filers and filings for
the SEC and investors.279 Under current regulations, issuers are not
required to conduct a sufficient investigation to express their § 16(a)
compliance disclosures with certainty.280 Rather, “[t]he disclosure
requirement is based on a review of the forms submitted to the
registrant during and with respect to its most recent fiscal year, as
specified above.”281 Accordingly, most of the companies in my
collection expressed their § 16(a) compliance disclosures as
opinions.282
With respect to Decision A, consistent with current law, issuer §
16(a) compliance disclosures are optimal because the marginal
benefits of these disclosures exceed their marginal costs.283 Indeed,
when adopting this disclosure mandate, the SEC performed a costbenefit analysis and concluded that the benefits inuring from
increased compliance with § 16(a) would outweigh the costs.284
With respect to Decision B, issuers are making the optimal
decision to express their § 16(a) compliance disclosures as opinions.
Although the informational value of these disclosures would be
enhanced by their expression with certainty, the marginal costs of
attaining certainty would likely exceed the marginal benefits
278. Ownership Reports and Trading By Officers, Directors and Principal Security Holders, SEC
Release No. 34-28869, 48 SEC Docket 0234 (Feb. 21, 1991) (“To address the non-compliance problem,
Item 405 of Regulation S-K adopted today requires a registrant to disclose in proxy and information
statements, Form 10-K reports, and Form N-SAR reports information regarding delinquent section 16
filings by insiders.”).
279. Id. at 0252 (“To assist the Commission and shareholders in identifying those registrants
disclosing delinquent filings or transactions by insiders, the cover page of Form 10-K has been
amended.”).
280. Id. (“A registrant does not have an obligation under Item 405 to research or make inquiry
regarding delinquent section 16(a) filings.”).
281. 17 C.F.R. § 229.405 note (Item 405 of Reg. S-K).
282. Only three companies expressed these mandatory disclosures as statements of fact, and even
those statements were expressed cautiously: AMGN 10-K SEC Filing (Feb. 16, 2016) (incorporated by
reference from Apr. 7, 2016 proxy statement p.99) (“Based solely on our review of the reports filed by
Reporting Persons and written representations from certain Reporting Persons that no other reports were
required for those persons, . . . .”); BMY 10-K SEC Filing (Feb. 12, 2016) (incorporated by reference
from March 23, 2016 proxy statement p.92) (“To the best of our knowledge, during 2015 all applicable
Section 16(a) filing requirements were met, . . . .”); and COP 10-K SEC Filing (Feb. 23, 2016)
(incorporated by reference from March 28, 2016 proxy statement p.78) (“To ConocoPhillips’
knowledge, based solely upon a review of the copies of such reports furnished to it and written
representations of its officers and directors, . . . .”).
283. See supra Part I.B.1.
284. Ownership Reports and Trading By Officers, Directors and Principal Security Holders, SEC
Release No. 34-28869, 49 SEC Docket 0256 (Feb. 21, 1991) (“It appears to the Commission that, while
some additional costs to issuers and insiders may result from the comprehensive restructuring of the
rules under Section 16, such costs will be outweighed by the savings to insiders with respect to deferred
reporting for exempt transactions and increased compliance with Section 16(a) as a result of Item 405,
which will benefit issuers, shareholders, and investors.”).
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thereof.285
The informational value of § 16(a) compliance disclosures would
be enhanced by their expression with certainty. Unlike compliance
with broad and complex regulatory schemes (such as environmental
regulations), compliance with § 16(a) is not inherently uncertain: §
16(a) imposes narrow, clear reporting requirements.286 For example,
since 2010, the SEC has issued only four no-action, interpretive, or
exemptive letters about § 16(a) reporting.287 For purposes of
comparison, before the § 16(a) reporting requirements were clarified
in 1991,288 the SEC “received more requests for interpretative and
no-action advice concerning the section 16 rules than any other
area.”289 Moreover, the informational value of § 16(a) compliance
disclosures does not emanate from the speaker’s state of mind—
investors and the SEC care about whether insiders complied with §
16(a), not whether the company thinks that insiders complied.
However, the marginal costs of expressing § 16(a) compliance
disclosures with certainty would likely exceed the marginal benefits
thereof. With respect to marginal costs, in order to express § 16(a)
compliance disclosures with certainty, issuers would have to
implement significant compliance programs290 to ensure that their
insiders filed all forms in a timely fashion and that any deficiencies
were captured.291 With respect to marginal benefits, the public would
285. See supra Part I.B.2.
286. Ownership Reports & Trading by Officers, Directors & Print Stockholders, SEC Release No.
34-26333, 1 (Dec. 2, 1988) (proposing amendments, which were largely adopted, “to revise these rules
to achieve greater clarity”).
287. See SEC, Division of Corporation Finance No-Action, Interpretive and Exemptive Letters, at
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction.shtml#s16 (listing the following letters related to §
16(a) compliance: Carlyle GMS Finance, SEC Interpretive Letter (Oct. 8, 2015); Davis Polk &
Wardwell LLP, SEC Interpretive Letter (Jan. 28, 2013); Simon Prop. Grp., Inc., SEC Interpretive Letter
(Nov. 21, 2011); Bank of Am. Corp., SEC Interpretive Letter (Apr. 29, 2011)).
288. Ownership Reports and Trading By Officers, Directors and Principal Security Holders, SEC
Release No. 34-28869, 49 SEC Docket 0234 (Feb. 21, 1991).
289. Ownership Reports & Trading by Officers, Directors & Print Stockholders, SEC Release No.
34-26333, at 6 (Dec. 2, 1988); see id. at 6 n.35 (“Since 1971, the staff has issued over 2000 no-action
letters that have addressed section 16. About 190 section 16 letters were issued in 1987 and 200 letters
in the first ten months of 1988.”).
290. As an example of a significant compliance regime, see Robert Lupone, Gen. Counsel,
Siemens, Remarks at the Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics Symposium: Corporate Compliance: The
Role of Company Counsel (Oct. 4, 2007), in 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 491, 526 (2008) (“We have audit
departments, we have human resources departments, [and] we have our lawyers who are counseling our
business operations day-to-day, often on site at the companies. We have compliance offices, we have
compliance committees. We have regulatory affairs groups. We have compliance hotlines.”).
291. Cf. Proposed Rules, Ownership Reports & Trading by Officers, Directors & Print
Stockholders, SEC Release No. 34-26333 (Dec. 2, 1988) (“The proposed amendments should not result
in any substantial increase in the compliance requirements imposed upon companies . . . . In order to
fulfill their disclosure obligations, registrants would have to review the Form 3, 4, and 5 reports filed by
their insiders.”).
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benefit to some degree from a company’s unequivocal statement
about its insiders’ compliance with § 16(a). First, if companies
conducted sufficient inquiries to express these disclosures as
statements of fact, and if insiders knew that companies would engage
in these inquiries, the degree of § 16(a) compliance by insiders would
likely increase, which would enable the public to reap the benefits of
increased compliance (e.g., the enhanced disincentive for insiders to
engage in insider trading). Second, the enhanced disclosure of
noncompliance would make it easier for investors and the SEC to
identify delinquent filers. However, using enhanced § 16(a)
compliance disclosures to achieve these societal benefits would be
largely duplicative of other, more direct methods that the SEC uses to
achieve these goals.292 The SEC already directly enforces the
prohibition on insider trading,293 and the SEC already uses
“quantitative data sources and ranking algorithms” to identify
insiders who fail to comply with § 16(a).294 On balance, therefore, it
is appropriate for companies to continue expressing their § 16(a)
compliance disclosures as opinions because the marginal costs of
issuers’ expressing § 16(a) compliance disclosures with certainty
would likely exceed the marginal benefits thereof.
Because issuers are making optimal disclosure decisions with
respect to their § 16(a) compliance disclosures, no adjustments to the
pressures facing issuers are needed.295
3. Discussion and Analysis Disclosures

Issuers’ discussion and analysis narrative disclosures—contained
in MD&A and CD&A—are replete with opinions.296 MD&A
disclosures serve three primary objectives: (1) to “provide a narrative
explanation of a company’s financial statements that enables
investors to see the company through the eyes of management;” (2)
to “enhance the overall financial disclosure and provide the context
292. See Ownership Reports and Trading By Officers, Directors and Principal Security Holders,
SEC Release No. 34-28869, 48 SEC Docket 0235 (Feb. 21, 1991) (“Section 16 is but one weapon
against insider trading.”).
293. SEC
Enforcement
Actions:
Insider
Trading
Cases,
https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/insidertrading/cases.shtml (“Insider trading continues to be a high priority
area for the SEC's enforcement program. In recent years, the SEC has filed insider trading cases against
hundreds of entities and individuals, including financial professionals, hedge fund managers, corporate
insiders, attorneys, and others whose illegal tipping or trading has undermined the level playing field
that is fundamental to the integrity and fair functioning of the capital markets.”).
294. SEC Announces Charges Against Corporate Insiders for Violating Laws Requiring Prompt
Reporting of Transactions and Holdings, Press Release No. 2014-190 (Sept. 10, 2014).
295. See supra Part II.C.
296. See supra text accompanying notes 174-189.
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within which financial information should be analyzed;” and (3) to
“provide information about the quality of, and potential variability of,
a company’s earnings and cash flow, so that investors can ascertain
the likelihood that past performance is indicative of future
performance.”297 Similarly, CD&A disclosures are intended “to
provide material information about the compensation objectives and
policies for named executive officers without resorting to boilerplate
disclosure” and “to put into perspective for investors the numbers and
narrative that follow it.”298
With respect to Decision A, consistent with current law, MD&A
and CD&A disclosures are optimal because the marginal benefits of
these disclosures exceed their marginal costs.299 MD&A is a critical
means for management to communicate directly to investors about
the fundamental issues of a company’s financial condition and
operations.300 CD&A is an avenue to promote “transparency
regarding company compensation policies and procedures.”301
Although both sets of disclosures impose significant costs, in light of
their centrality to investors’ understanding of the company, those are
outweighed by the benefits.302
With respect to Decision B, issuers are making the optimal
decision to express their MD&A and CD&A disclosures in the form
of opinions. The informational value of these disclosures is
enhanced by their expression as opinions because their value
emanates from the speaker’s state of mind itself.303 The essence of
MD&A disclosures is “to give the investor an opportunity to look at
the company through the eyes of management by providing both a
short and long-term analysis of the business of the company.”304
Similarly, CD&A disclosures focus “on how and why a company

297. SEC Staff Interpretation, Commission Guidance Regarding MD&A of Financial Condition
& Results of Operation, Release Nos. 33-8350; 34-48960; FR-72 (Dec. 19, 2003).
298. Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure; Final Rule & Proposed Rule, SEC
Release No. 34-54302A, 71 Fed. Reg. 174 (Sept. 8, 2006).
299. See supra Part I.B.1.
300. SEC Staff Interpretation, Commission Guidance Regarding MD&A of Financial Condition
& Results of Operation, Release Nos. 33-8350; 34-48960; FR-72 (Dec. 19, 2003) (“We believe that
management's most important responsibilities include communicating with investors in a clear and
straightforward manner. MD&A is a critical component of that communication.”).
301. Final Rule & Proposed Rule, Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, SEC
Release No. 34-54302A (Sept. 8, 2006).
302. Id. (“While we believe that these amendments will result in significant benefits, we also
recognize that the amendments to the disclosure requirements will impose additional costs. We have
considered the costs and benefits in adopting these amendments.”).
303. See supra Part I.B.2.
304. SEC Staff Interpretation, Management’s Discussion & Analysis of Financial Condition and
Results of Operations, SEC Release No. 34-26831 (May 18, 1989).
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arrives at specific executive compensation decisions and policies.”305
In sum, the value of MD&A and CD&A disclosures derives from
their revelation of the thought processes of various company actors,
including management, the compensation committee, and the board.
Indeed, some of the MD&A opinions included in my collection (37
out of 327) were explicitly characterized as those of
“management,”306 and many of the CD&A opinions (140 out of 278)
were identified as those of the compensation committee.307
Therefore, these disclosures, whose informational value emanates
from the speaker’s state of mind itself, are appropriately expressed in
the form of opinions.
Because issuers are making optimal disclosure decisions with
respect to their MD&A and CD&A disclosures, no adjustments to the
pressures facing issuers are necessary.308
4. Disclosures about the Suitability or Adequacy of Physical Properties

Issuers sometimes express opinions about the suitability or
adequacy of their physical properties.309 Current regulations do not
require issuers to state explicitly whether their physical properties are
suitable or adequate. Rather, issuers must disclose “such information
as reasonably will inform investors as to the suitability, adequacy,
productive capacity and extent of utilization” of the issuers’
materially important physical properties.310
Issuers “typically
disclose information about their headquarters such as the location,
size and whether they own or lease the property.”311
305. SEC Staff Observations, Division of Corporation Finance, Staff Observations in the Review
of Executive Compensation Disclosure (Oct. 9, 2007); see also John W. White, Director, Division of
Corporation Finance, Where’s the Analysis?: Tackling Your 2008 Compensation Disclosures: The 2nd
Annual Proxy Disclosure Conference (October 9, 2007).
306. E.g., CL 10-K SEC Filing p.38 (Feb. 18, 2016) (“Management believes this [non-GAAP]
measure provides investors with useful supplemental information regarding the Company’s underlying
sales trends by presenting sales growth excluding the external factor of foreign exchange, as well as the
impact of acquisitions and divestments.”).
307. E.g., CVX 10-K SEC Filing (Feb. 25, 2016) (incorporated by reference from Apr. 7, 2016
proxy statement p.42) (“This combination provides a balance of awards, which the MCC [Management
Compensation Committee] believes appropriates serves both performance incentive and executive
retention objectives.”).
308. See supra Part II.C.
309. See supra text accompanying notes 219-21.
310. 17 C.F.R. § 229.102 instr. 1 (Item 102 of Reg. S-K) (2009).
311. Business and Financial Disclosure Required by Regulation S-K, SEC Release No. 34-77599,
81-82 (Apr. 13, 2016) (“In response to Item 102, registrants typically disclose information about their
headquarters such as the location, size and whether they own or lease the property . . . In addition to this
disclosure, some registrants cross-reference to the discussion in the notes to the financial statements
such as to the note on purchase and lease commitments or to the note on property, plant and
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The SEC has long sought to make property disclosures more useful
to investors.
In 1996, the SEC Task Force on Disclosure
Simplification recommended that the property disclosure rules be
revised “in a manner that more effectively elicits disclosure of
material facts regarding a registrant’s principal properties, rather than
lists of properties and their immaterial characteristics.”312 This
recommendation was not adopted by the SEC. In 2016, the SEC
issued a concept release seeking public comment on modernizing
disclosure requirements, including how to improve property
disclosures to make them more meaningful to investors.313
The companies in my collection differed with respect to their
disclosures about the suitability or adequacy of their physical
properties. Sixteen of the issuers in my collection expressed
generalized opinions about the suitability or adequacy of their
properties.314 For example, American Express Company stated: “We
believe the facilities we own or occupy suit our needs and are well
maintained.”315 Three of the issuers expressed statements of fact
about the suitability or adequacy of their properties.316 For example,
Colgate-Palmolive Company stated: “All of the facilities we operate
are well maintained and adequate for the purpose for which they are
intended.”317 Twelve issuers did not make any disclosures directly
addressing the suitability or adequacy of their properties.318
equipment.”).
312. Levitt, Arthur, Report of Task Force on Disclosure Simplification (March 5, 1996).
313. Business and Financial Disclosure Required by Regulation S-K, SEC Release No. 34-77599,
79-83. Note that the SEC has also proposed revisions to the property disclosure requirements for
mining companies, for whom physical properties are uniquely important. See Rule, Modernization of
Property Disclosures for Mining Registrants, SEC Release No. 34-78086 (June 16, 2016).
314. The following companies expressed generalized opinions about the suitability or adequacy of
their physical properties in their post-Omnicare 10-Ks: AAPL 10-K SEC Filing (Oct. 28, 2015); ABBV
10-K SEC Filing (Feb. 19, 2016); ACN 10-K SEC Filing (Oct. 30, 2015); AGN 10-K SEC Filing (Feb.
26, 2016); AIG 10-K SEC Filing (Feb. 19, 2016); AMGN 10-K SEC Filing (Feb. 16, 2016); AXP 10-K
SEC Filing (Feb. 19, 2016); BA 10-K SEC Filing (Feb. 10, 2016); BAC 10-K SEC Filing (Feb. 24,
2016); MO 10-K SEC Filing (Feb. 25, 2016); CAT 10-K SEC Filing (Feb. 16, 2016); CVS 10-K SEC
Filing (Feb. 9, 2016); CSCO 10-K SEC Filing (Sept. 8, 2015); CMCSA 10-K SEC Filing (Feb. 5, 2016);
KO 10-K SEC Filing (Feb. 25, 2016).
315. AXP 10-K SEC Filing p.46 (Feb. 19, 2016).
316. The following companies expressed statements of fact about the suitability or adequacy of
their physical properties in their post-Omnicare 10-Ks: ABT 10-K SEC Filing (Feb. 19, 2016); MMM
10-K SEC Filing (Feb. 11, 2016); and CL 10-K SEC Filing (Feb. 18. 2016).
317. CL 10-K SEC Filing p.11 (Feb. 18, 2016).
318. The following companies did not make express disclosures about the adequacy or suitability
of their physical properties in their post-Omnicare 10-Ks: ALL 10-K SEC Filing (Feb. 19, 2016);
AMZN 10-K SEC Filing (Jan. 29, 2016); BIIB 10-K SEC Filing (Feb. 3, 2016); BLK 10-K SEC Filing
(Feb. 26, 2016); BMY 10-K SEC Filing (Feb. 12, 2016); BRKB 10-K SEC Filing (Feb. 29, 2016); T 10K SEC Filing (Feb. 18, 2016); COF 10-K SEC Filing (Feb. 25, 2016); CELG 10-K SEC Filing (Feb. 11,
2016); CVX 10-K SEC Filing (Feb. 25, 2016); C 10-K SEC Filing (Feb. 26, 2016); and COP 10-K SEC
Filing (Feb. 23, 2016).
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With respect to Decision A, it is optimal for issuers to make
disclosures directly addressing the suitability or adequacy of their
physical properties for existing operations because the marginal
benefits of these disclosures would exceed their marginal costs.319
On the benefits side, companies are in the best position to assess their
existing properties; and absent extensive and detailed disclosures
about the characteristics and usage of each property, investors are
unable to reach independent conclusions about those properties’
suitability and adequacy. On the costs side, although the disclosures
themselves would impose some costs, the requisite assessment is
already a critical component of running a company.
With respect to Decision B, disclosures about the suitability or
adequacy of a company’s physical properties for existing operations
are optimally expressed as statements of fact.320 First, these
disclosures are not more valuable when expressed as opinions rather
than as statements of fact. Because it is possible to assess with a high
degree of confidence whether a company’s physical facilities are
suitable and adequate for the company’s existing operations, the
disclosures are not inherently uncertain.
In addition, the
informational value of these disclosures does not emanate from the
speaker’s state of mind itself: investors care about whether a
company’s properties are suitable and adequate, not about the
company’s belief with respect to suitability and adequacy. Further,
the marginal costs of achieving this level of certainty would be
unlikely to exceed the marginal benefits thereof. With respect to
marginal costs, assessing the adequacy and suitability of a company’s
physical properties is a core management function and, in a well-run
company, is already occurring; thus, the marginal costs of requiring
the company to make this assessment with certainty would be
negligible.
With respect to marginal benefits, a company’s
expression of certainty with respect to the adequacy or suitability of
the company’s physical properties would enhance the
meaningfulness of this disclosure to investors, without cluttering the
disclosure with unnecessary details about those properties and their
usage. Therefore, the optimal issuer disclosure decision is to express
disclosures about the adequacy or suitability of existing properties as
statements of fact.
Because many companies are not making optimal decisions with
respect to disclosures about the adequacy or suitability of their
physical properties, adjustments to the pressures facing issuers are

319. See supra Part I.B.1.
320. See supra Part I.B.2.
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warranted.321 With respect to Decision A, the SEC should require
issuers to make an express disclosure about suitability or adequacy of
physical properties for existing operations, to be enforced with the
SEC review and comment process. With respect to Decision B, the
SEC should mandate that these disclosures be expressed as
statements of fact, again enforcing compliance via the SEC review
and comment process. These adjustments would likely be sufficient
to channel issuers to optimal disclosure decisions.
5. Disclosures about the Effectiveness of Internal Controls over
Financial Reporting

A sizable minority of companies in my collection (6 out of 30)
expressed their management’s annual report on the effectiveness of
internal controls over financial reporting as opinions.322 Public
companies are required to maintain “internal control over financial
reporting,”323 which is a process designed to “provide reasonable
assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the
preparation of financial statements for external purposes in
accordance with generally accepted accounting principles.”324
Although the “reasonable assurance” standard is objective,325 it is not
synonymous with “absolute assurance.”326 In other words, a
restatement of a company’s financials does not necessarily mean that
the company’s internal controls failed to meet the requisite standard
of effectiveness.327
In addition, management must annually assess the effectiveness of
321. See supra Part II.C.
322. See supra text accompanying notes 244-49.
323. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-15(a) (2007); 17 C.F.R. § 240.15d-15(a) (2007).
324. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-15(f); 17 C.F.R. § 240.15d-15(f).
325. Commission Guidance Regarding Management’s Report on Internal Control over Financial
Reporting Under Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Sec. Exch. Act of 1934, SEC Release No. 34-55929 (June
20, 2007) (“[T]he Commission recognizes that while ‘reasonableness’ is an objective standard, there is a
range of judgments that an issuer might make as to what is ‘reasonable’ in implementing Section 404
and the Commission’s rules.”).
326. Id. (“ICFR cannot provide absolute assurance due to its inherent limitations; it is a process
that involves human diligence and compliance and is subject to lapses in judgment and breakdowns
resulting from human failures. ICFR also can be circumvented by collusion or improper management
override.”).
327. Id. (“[T]he restatement of financial statements does not, by itself, necessitate that
management consider the effect of the restatement on the company’s prior conclusion related to the
effectiveness of ICFR. While there is no requirement for management to reassess or revise its
conclusion related to the effectiveness of ICFR, management should consider whether its original
disclosures are still appropriate and should modify or supplement its original disclosure to include any
other material information that is necessary for such disclosures not to be misleading in light of the
restatement.”).
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the company’s internal controls pursuant to “a suitable, recognized
control framework that is established by a body or group that has
followed due-process procedures, including the broad distribution of
the framework for public comment.”328 The assessment framework
must:
be free from bias; permit reasonably consistent qualitative and
quantitative measurements of a company’s internal control; be
sufficiently complete so that those relevant factors that would
alter a conclusion about the effectiveness of a company’s
internal controls are not omitted; and be relevant to an
evaluation of internal control over financial reporting.329
Finally, issuers are required to annually disclose “[m]anagement’s
assessment of the effectiveness of the registrant’s internal control
over financial reporting as of the end of the registrant’s most recent
fiscal year, including a statement as to whether or not internal control
over financial reporting is effective.”330 This disclosure requirement,
one of multiple reforms mandated by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002,331 is intended to “enhance the quality of reporting and increase
investor confidence in the financial markets” by “improving public
company disclosure to investors about the extent of management’s
responsibility for the company’s financial statements and internal
control over financial reporting and the means by which management
discharges its responsibility.”332
If expressed as a statement of fact, management’s report on the
effectiveness of internal controls does not guarantee with “absolute
assurance” that the controls are effective; rather, it expresses with
certainty that the controls meet the objective standard of “reasonable
assurance” of effectiveness. If expressed as an opinion, the report
layers a degree of uncertainty over the “reasonable assurance”
standard.
Current regulations do not explicitly mandate that management’s
report on internal control over financial reporting should be
expressed as a statement of fact, but there are several indications that
the report should be so expressed. First, the regulation contains the
328. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-15(c); 17 C.F.R. § 240.15d-15(c).
329. Management’s Report on Internal Control over Financial Reporting & Certification of
Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Reports, SEC Release No. 34-47986 (June 5, 2003).
330. 17 C.F.R. § 229.308(a)(3) (2017).
331. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 404(a), 15 U.S.C. § 7262(a) (2012) (directing the SEC to
adopt rules mandating an annual internal control assessment).
332. Management’s Report on Internal Control over Financial Reporting & Certification of
Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Reports, SEC Release No. 34-47986 (June 5, 2003).
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following prohibition, which by using the term “conclude” implies
that the report should be expressed with certainty: “Management is
not permitted to conclude that the registrant’s internal control over
financial reporting is effective if there are one or more material
weaknesses in the registrant’s internal control over financial
reporting.”333 Second, the SEC has provided guidance that the report
should be clear and unqualified.334 To date, however, the SEC has
not flagged this as an issue during the review and comment process
and has, on occasion, suggested that these reports may reflect
management’s belief about effectiveness.335
With respect to Decision A, consistent with current law, issuers are
making the optimal choice to disclose management reports on the
effectiveness of internal controls over financial reporting because the
marginal benefits likely exceed the marginal costs.336 On the benefits
side, these reports enable investors “to better evaluate management’s
performance of its stewardship responsibilities and the reliability of a
company’s financial statements.”337 In addition, they encourage
“companies to devote adequate resources and attention to the
maintenance of such control.”338 Further, they “should help to
identify potential weaknesses and deficiencies in advance of a system
breakdown.”339 As explained by the SEC, “[a]ll of these benefits will
increase market efficiency by improving investor confidence in the
333. 17 C.F.R. § 229.308(a)(3).
334. Commission Guidance Regarding Management’s Report on Internal Control over Financial
Reporting Under Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Sec. Exch. Act of 1934, SEC Release No. 34-55929 (June
20, 2007) (“Management should clearly disclose its assessment of the effectiveness of ICFR and,
therefore, should not qualify its assessment by stating that the company’s ICFR is effective subject to
certain qualifications or exceptions.”); Management’s Report on Internal Control over Financial
Reporting & Certification of Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Reports, SEC Release No. 34-47986
(June 5, 2003) (“If management decides to include a discussion of reasonable assurance in the internal
control report, the discussion must be presented in a manner that neither makes the disclosure in the
report confusing nor renders management’s assessment concerning the effectiveness of the company’s
internal control over financial reporting unclear.”).
335. E.g., SEC Staff Comment Ltrs. 10467872 (C.C.H.), 2009 WL 10467872 (Jan. 8, 2009) (“If
you continue to believe your disclosure controls and procedures are effective, please tell us the factors
you considered and highlight for us those factors that supported your conclusion. Otherwise, please
amend your Form 10-K to disclose management's revised conclusion on the effectiveness of your
disclosure controls and procedures as of the end of the fiscal year and any remediation plans that have or
will be enacted.”); SEC Staff Comment Ltrs. 9394016 (C.C.H.), 2007 WL 9394016 (Feb. 23, 2007)
(“We note that your Form 10-K filed on April 11, 2005 discloses that your disclosure controls and
procedures as well as your internal controls over financial reporting were effective. Tell us why you
believe that those were reasonable conclusions given the serious limitations inherent in your controls
regarding inventory and its proper valuation.”).
336. See supra Part I.B.1.
337. Management’s Report on Internal Control over Financial Reporting & Certification of
Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Reports, SEC Release No. 34-47986 (June 5, 2003).
338. Id.
339. Id.
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reliability of a company's financial disclosure and system of internal
control over financial reporting.”340 On the costs side, these reports
require participation by “senior management, internal auditors, inhouse counsel, outside counsel and audit committee members.”341
As recognized by the SEC, however, “[t]hese costs are mitigated
somewhat because companies have an existing obligation to maintain
an adequate system of internal accounting control.”342
With respect to Decision B, the optimal decision is to express
management’s reports on the effectiveness of internal controls over
financial reporting as statements of fact.343 First, these disclosures
are not more valuable when expressed as opinions rather than as
statements of fact. It is possible to assess with a high degree of
confidence whether a company’s internal controls satisfy the
objective “reasonable assurance” standard, and thus the disclosure is
not inherently uncertain. In addition, the informational value of the
disclosures does not emanate from the speaker’s state of mind itself:
investors care about whether a company’s internal controls are
effective, not whether management believes that they are effective.
Further, the marginal costs of achieving this level of certainty would
be unlikely to exceed the marginal benefits thereof. With respect to
marginal costs, management is already required to assess the
effectiveness of its internal controls, and performing that assessment
with sufficient depth to achieve certainty is not significantly more
arduous than performing that assessment to achieve belief. With
respect to marginal benefits, a company’s expression of certainty that
the company’s internal controls satisfy the objective “reasonable
assurance” standard would enhance the meaningfulness of this
disclosure to investors, encourage companies to devote adequate
resources to its internal controls, and increase the reliability of a
company’s financial statements. All of these benefits would promote
market efficiency and help to prevent the corporate scandals that led
to the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
Because some companies, by expressing their management reports
on the effectiveness of internal controls over financial reporting as
opinions, are not making an optimal Decision B, adjustments to the
pressures facing issuers are required.344 In particular, the SEC should
clarify that these disclosures must be expressed as statements of fact
and enforce compliance via the SEC review and comment process.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra Part I.B.2.
See supra Part II.C.
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These adjustments would likely be sufficient to channel issuers to
optimal disclosure decisions.
CONCLUSION

This Article proposes a new theoretical framework for optimal
issuer disclosure—the Issuers’ Disclosure Framework—which
incorporates the subsidiary decision about whether to express
disclosures as opinions or as statements of fact. This Article also
performs a qualitative analysis of issuers’ post-Omnicare opinion
disclosures and, drawing from the Issuers’ Disclosure Framework,
proposes several discrete reforms to the existing pressures affecting
issuers’ disclosure decisions in order to incentivize issuers to make
optimal choices.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol86/iss2/4

66

